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INTRODUCTION 
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Anastasoff v. United States l has generated 
significant discussion of ''unpublished,'' or more accurately, "non-precedential" 
judicial opinions2 and corresponding "no-citation" rules that limit or prohibit 
citation to those opinions.) Most of the discussion has focused on the normative 
t Copyright 2004 Amy E. Sloan. All rights reserved. 
* Associate Professor of Law and Co-director, Legal Skills Program, University of 
Baltimore School of Law. I would like to th~ Dionne Koller, Michael Meyerson, Richard 
K. Neumann, Jr., Terrill Pollman, Suzanne Rowe, Elizabeth Samuels, and Nancy Schultz for 
their comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I would also like to thank Susan B. Koonin 
for providing research assistance. 
1. 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir.), vacated en banc as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000). In 
Anastasoff, the Eighth Circuit, sua sponte, determined that its local rule permitting it 
prospectively to designate opinions as non-precedential was unconstitutional. According to 
the court, the rule violated Article III because the Framers of the Constitution understood the 
judicial power to be limited by the requirement that courts adhere to precedent. [d. at 900-03. 
2. Virtually all judicial opinions are now "published" in the sense of being publicly 
available, either electronically or in print. Accordingly, the term "unpublished" opinion is a 
misnomer; the more accurate term is "non-precedential" opinion. See infra notes 41-46 and 
accompanying text (discussing the evolution of "unpublished" opinions to 
"non-precedential" opinions). 
3. See, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting AnastasoJfs 
conclusion that courts are required by the Constitution to follow prior decisions); 
712 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vo1.79:711 
aspects of the practice (whether issuing non-precedential opinions is a good idea, or 
at least a justifiable one) or on the constitutionality of the practice from the 
standpoint of the judicial power (whether Article III requires courts to follow prior 
decisions).4 
One important issue in the debate that has not received significant attention 
concerns the means the courts have used to implement this system of designating 
opinions as non-precedential. In effect, the rules governing non-precedential 
opinions modify the principles of stare decisis.5 They give courts the discretion to 
opt in or out of the traditional rule of horizontal stare decisis, which requires courts 
to follow their own prior decisions.6 The federal courts traditionally have 
Unpublished Judicial Opinions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and 
Intellectual Prop. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 107th Congo 
(2002) [hereinafter Hearings]; Symposium, Anastasoff, Unpublished Opinions, and "No 
Citation" Rules, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 175 (2001) (collecting eleven articles on the 
topic); Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart to West's Federal Appendix: The 
Ground Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS I (2002) (explaining 
developments in the non-precedential opinion debate); Richard B. Cappalli, The Common 
Law's Case Against Non-Precedential Opinions, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 755 (2003); David 
Greenwald & Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., The Censorial Judiciary, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 
1133 (2002) (arguing that no-citation rules are unconstitutional); Thomas Healy, Stare 
Decisis as a Constitutional Requirement, 104 W. VA. L. REv. 43 (2001) (arguing that the 
use of non-precedential opinions is consistent with the values that animate the principle of 
stare decisis); Charles R. Eloshway, Note, Say It Ain't So: Non-Precedential Opinions 
Exceed the Limits of Article III Powers, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 632 (2002) (arguing that 
courts lack the rulemaking power to issue non-precedential opinions). 
4. See sources cited supra notes 1 & 3. 
5. "Stare decisis" refers to adherence to prior precedent. Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pa. V. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
1414 (7th ed. 1999) (defining stare decisis as "[t]he doctrine of precedent, under which it is 
necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in 
litigation"). 
6. Stare decisis works in two directions, horizontally and vertically. Horizontal stare 
decisis is the requirement that courts follow their own prior opinions. In the federal appellate 
courts, this requirement applies within each circuit, that is, individual panels within each 
circuit are bound by opinions of prior panels within the same circuit. See infra note 80 and 
accompanying text. Panel decisions can only be reversed or overruled by the court sitting en 
banc or by the Supreme Court. Id. Vertical stare decisis is the requirement that subordinate 
courts follow the prior opinions of higher courts. The practice of issuing non-precedential 
opinions also has implications for vertical stare decisis. None of the federal circuit courts' 
local rules defines the weight of non-precedential opinions for district courts, and they have 
taken three approaches to the citation of such opinions. The Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, 
and Ninth Circuits' rules address citation of non-precedential opinions to the district courts 
in the circuit. SECOND CIR. R. 0.23; FOURTIi CIR. R. 36(c); SIXTH CIR. R. 28(g); SEVENTIi 
CIR. R. 53; NINTIi CIR. R. 36-3. The First, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, District of 
Columbia, and Federal Circuits' rules address the citation of non-precedential opinions to 
the circuit courts themselves, but are otherwise unclear about whether those opinions can be 
cited to district courts. FIRST CIR. R. 32.3; FlFrH CIR. R. 47.5; EIGHTH CIR. R. 28A(i); TENTIi 
CIR. R. 36.3; ELEVENTH CIR. R. 36-2; D.C. CIR. R. 28(c); FED. CIR. R. 47.6. The Third 
Circuit's rule does not address parties' ability to cite non-precedential opinions, providing 
only that the court itself does not ordinarily cite them. THIRD CIR. I.O.P. 5.7. Some of the 
same considerations that apply to horizontal stare decisis may also apply to issues 
surrounding vertical stare decisis, although the variations in circuit rules might affect that 
analysis. For further discussion of the issues surrounding vertical stare decisis, see Evan H. 
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established rules of precedent through the adjudicatory process. 7 By contrast, they 
regulate the practice of issuing and citing non-precedential opinions largely through 
their local rules.8 In addition, a new Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure has been 
proposed to eliminate the restrictions on citing non-precedential opinions, although 
it does not eliminate the practice of issuing them.9 
The fact that the federal appellate courts use local procedural rules to authorize 
this practice raises interesting questions about how it might be changed. Of course, 
the federal appellate courts could end the practice on their own by changing their 
local rules. 1O This is unlikely. The federal appellate courts have placed increasing 
reliance on non-precedential opinions over the past thirty years, I using them as a 
docket management tool,12 and are not inclined to abandon the practice unilaterally 
now. 13 
Another possibility is invalidating the local rules through litigation on the 
ground that they are unconstitutional. This is also an unlikely avenue for changing 
the practice. With the exception of Anastasoff, the federal courts have upheld the 
constitutionality of local rules regarding non-precedential opinions,14 and even 
Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REv. 
817 (1994). 
7. Hearings, supra note 3, at 6 (statement of Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr.) (noting that the 
courts have traditionally developed principles of stare decisis through adjudication); id. at 9 
(statement of Judge Alito) (noting that courts established principles of stare decisis as part of 
the common law); see also infra note 80 (citing cases from each circuit stating that it follows 
the principle of horizontal stare decisis). 
8. See infra note 25 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra note 58 and accompanying text. 
10. Indeed, Judge Richard Arnold, the author of the AnastasoJf opinion, tried 
unsuccessfully to persuade his colleagues on the Eighth Circuit to change at least the no-
citation rule. Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 219, 225 (1999). 
11. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (showing increased use of non-
precedential opinions over time). Approximately 80% of federal appellate opinions are non-
precedential. Id. 
12. Although defenders of non-precedential opinions have tried to frame the issue so 
that the practice is really to the benefit of litigants, the primary reason the federal appellate 
courts issue non-precedential opinions is to manage their dockets. Compare Hearings, supra 
note 3, at 7 (statement of Judge Alito) (noting a variety of reasons for issuing 
non-precedential opinions, including conservation of opinion-writing time for precedential 
opinions, preservation of "the consistency and quality of precedential decisions," and saving 
"time and money for attorneys" so that they are not required to research vast amounts of case 
law and pay for more reporter volumes) with id. at 8 (statement of Judge Alito) (explaining 
that the courts of appeals would fmd it virtually impossible to stay current with their dockets 
if they produced precedential opinions in every case) and id. at 10-11 (statement of Judge 
Alex Kozinski) (explaining how "difficult and time consuming" writing precedential 
opinions is and concluding that Ninth Circuit judges could not devote that level of effort to 
every case given the number of cases they must resolve each year). 
13. Non-precedential opinions have been characterized as "essential for the survival of 
the federal appellate courts." ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE RULES, MINUTES OF THE 
SPRING 2002 MEETING 25 (April 22, 2002) (as approved Nov. 18,2002) [hereinafter APRIL 
MEETING] (statement of unnamed committee member), at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules 
IMinutes/app0402.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2004). The federal circuit courts are not likely to 
abandon a practice they consider vital to their very survival on their own. 
14. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001), was the first case to challenge 
the Eighth Circuit's analysis. Others have followed. See, e.g., Symbol Techs., Inc. v. 
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Anastasof{ was later vacated. 15 Moreover, procedural hurdles make judicial review 
difficult to obtain. In the two main cases addressing the issue, the courts raised the 
validity of the local rules sua sponte,16 which is not a reliable avenue for obtaining 
review of an issue. Additional challenges to obtaining judicial review of the local 
rules include finding a case that has the right facts, is in the correct procedural 
posture, and involves a litigant who has standing. I? These obstacles are especially 
daunting because, in the absence of Supreme Court review, the issue would have to 
be litigated in each circuit. Obtaining Supreme Court review presents a further 
challenge because the Court takes few cases and has been reluctant in the past to 
address the permissibility of non-precedential opinions. 18 
Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (adopting Hart's analysis and 
conclusion that local rules authorizing non-precedential opinions are valid); Schmier v. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 279 F.3d 817, 819, 825 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(upholding dismissal of a petition for writ of mandamus to force the Ninth Circuit to permit 
citation to non-precedential opinions on the ground that the petitioner lacked standing and 
citing Hart for the proposition that the rules are constitutional); In re Mays, 256 B.R. 555, 
558-59 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2000) (allowing parties to rely on non-precedential opinions because 
the local bankruptcy rules did not address the practice, but criticizing AnastasoJf s 
conclusion that adherence to such opinions is constitutionally required). 
15. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir.), vacated en banc as moot, 235 
F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000). 
16. In both AnastasoJf and Hart, the courts raised the issue of the constitutionality of 
local rules regarding non-precedential opinions on their own. Tony Mauro, Stealth Decisions 
Under Fire, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 4, 2000, at 6 (describing how the issue of the court's 
obligation to follow a prior non-precedential opinion in AnastasoJf was raised sua sponte 
during oral argument); Hart, 266 F.3d at 1159 (ordering counsel who violated the Ninth 
Circuit's no-citation rule to show cause why he should not be disciplined). Thus, both courts 
effectively hijacked other claims to make their points, a practice which raises its own 
legitimacy concerns. See generally Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A 
Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REv. 245 (2002). 
17. In Schmier v. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 136 F. Supp. 2d 
1048,1049 (N.D. Cal. 2001), affd, 279 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 2002), the plaintiff, a member of 
the Ninth Circuit bar, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to force the Ninth Circuit to stop 
enforcing its local rules regarding non-precedential opinions. The district court questioned 
whether it had jurisdiction to review a rule of a higher court. Id. at 1050. The court declined 
to reach that issue or the merits of the case, however, because it determined that the plaintiff 
lacked standing. Id. at 1051. He had not attempted to cite a non-precedential opinion or 
unsuccessfully requested that the Ninth Circuit reissue a non-precedential opinion as 
precedential. Id. at 1052. To challenge the rules, a plaintiff would have to be able to show 
some injury from the application of the rule, and even if that could be shown, it might be 
difficult to find a plaintiff willing to pursue an action to invalidate the rules. See Gregory C. 
Sisle, The Balkanization of Appellate Justice: The Proliferation of Local Rules in the Federal 
Circuits, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 54 (1997) (noting that obtaining judicial review of local 
circuit rules is difficult because the rules are rarely pivotal in the outcome of a case and the 
problems they create are usually resolved before the conclusion of the litigation, among 
other reasons). 
18. The Supreme Court has had two opportunities to consider the federal appellate 
courts' authority to issue non-precedential opinions. In Do-Right Auto Sales v. United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 429 U.S. 917 (1976), the Supreme Court issued a 
one-sentence opinion denying a motion to file a petition for a writ of mandamus after the 
Seventh Circuit struck the petitioners' citation of a non-precedential opinion. See David 
Dunn, Note, Unreported Decisions in the United States Court of Appeals, 63 CORNELL L. 
REv. 128, 142-43 (1977-78) (detailing the history of the Do-Right Auto Sales case). In 
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Moreover, invalidation of the practice of issuing non-precedential opinions 
through litigation may not be the best approach from a policy perspective. 
Adjudication is an all-or-nothing approach. If the local rules were invalidated this 
way, all previously issued non-precedential opinions, no matter when decided, 
could change status and become precedential. Given the degree to which the 
federal appellate courts rely on non-precedential opinions, that would be a big 
change to absorb overnight. 
Because local circuit rules are subordinate to the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and federal statutes,19 another possibility is prohibiting the practice of 
issuing non-precedential opinions by rule or statute. The federal courts have been 
studying a national approach to this issue for over ten years.20 The proposed new 
rule eliminating citation restrictions, although it does not expressly address the 
permissibility of non-precedential opinions, is an indication that the federal courts 
are feeling pressure to address this issue nationally.21 
A rule-based or statutory approach, in contrast to litigation, potentially has 
several advantages. For one thing, a national rule or statute would eliminate the 
practice nationwide, whereas litigation circuit by circuit could lead to inconsistent 
rules, unless and until the Supreme Court resolved any conflicts. Moreover, a rule-
based or statutory solution could allow for a phase-in period or provide other 
means of easing the transition away from non-precedential opinions. 
This Article discusses the constitutionality of a national procedural rule or 
federal statute prohibiting the federal appellate courts from prospectively 
designating selected opinions as non-precedential. In Part I, this Article explains 
how the rules governing non-precedential o~inions allow federal appellate courts to 
"opt out" of their own rules of precedent. 2 In Part II, this Article examines the 
rulemaking process, showing how the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are 
promulgated pursuant to delegated legislative authority and can, therefore, regulate 
only matters that Congress could regulate by statute.23 Part III explores the 
constitutional limits of Congress's ability to regulate the courts' use of precedent. It 
shows that a federal statute or national rule prohibiting prospective designation of 
selected opinions as non-precedential would be constitutional. As long as the 
statute did not specify the weight federal appellate courts must accord to their own 
opinions, it would not encroach impermissibly on the courts' Article III judicial 
power.24 
Browder v. Director, Department of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257,258 n.1 (1978), the Court 
granted certiorari, but declined to discuss the validity of the Seventh Circuit's citation 
restrictions. 
19. 28 U.S.c. § 2071(a) (2000) (providing that local rules cannot conflict with federal 
statutes or national rules); FED. R. APP. P. 47(a) (repeating the language of 28 U.S.C. § 
2071 (a». 
20. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (explaining the history of proposals to 
address non-precedential opinions nationally). 
21. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (discussing the shift in circumstances 
that has caused the federal courts to consider a national rule eliminating citation restrictions). 
22. See infra Part I. 
23. See infra Part II. 
24. See infra Part m. 
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I. THE LOCAL RULES AND THEIR EFFECT 
A. Regulation of Non-Precedential Opinions Through Local Procedural Rules 
Federal appellate courts authorize and regulate the practice of issuing non-
precedential opinions through their local rules and, to a lesser extent, internal 
operating procedures.25 The practice has two components: rules defining when 
25. FIRST eIR. R. 32.3 (permitting, but disfavoring, citation to non-precedential 
opinions for persuasive value), 36 (authorizing non-precedential opinions and establishing 
criteria for determining whether opinions will be precedential or non-precedential); SECOND 
OR. R. 0.23 (authorizing non-precedential opinions and prohibiting citation to 
non-precedential opinions "before this or any other court"); THIRD OR. I.O.P. 5.2 
(explaining that an "opinion ... is designated as precedential ... when it has precedential or 
institutional value"), 5.3 (authorizing non-precedential opinions), 5.7 (stating that the court 
does not cite to non-precedential opinions because they "are not regarded as precedents that 
bind the court"); FOURTH OR. R. 36(a) (establishing criteria for issuing precedential 
opinions), 36(b) (authorizing non-precedential opinions), 36(c) (permitting, but disfavoring, 
citation to non-precedential opinions as persuasive authority); FIFTH OR. R. 47.5 
(establishing criteria for designating opinions as precedential, defining unpublished opinions 
issued before January 1, 1996, as precedent that should be cited only in related cases, and 
declaring unpUblished opinions issued on or after January 1, 1996, not to be precedent but 
permitting citation to them for persuasive value); SIXTH eIR. R. 206 (establishing criteria for 
issuing precedential opinions), 28(g) (permitting, but disfavoring, citation to 
non-precedential opinions); SEVENTH eIR. R. 53 (authorizing non-precedential opinions, 
establishing criteria for determining whether opinions will be precedential or 
non-precedential, and prohibiting citation to non-precedential opinions); EIGHTH OR. ApP. I 
(establishing criteria for designating opinions as precedential and prohibiting citation to 
non-precedential opinions), R. 28A(i) (declaring that unpublished opinions are not precedent 
and permitting citation to them for persuasive value); NINTH eIR. R. 36-1 (defining 
categories of dispositions, including opinions, memoranda, and orders), 36-2 (establishing 
criteria for designating opinions as precedential), 36-3 (declaring that unpublished opinions 
are not binding precedent and prohibiting citation to them except in related cases, in a 
request to publish the opinion, in a petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc, or to 
demonstrate a conflict among the court's dispositions); TENTH eIR. R. 36.1 (authorizing 
disposition without published opinion in any case that "does not require application of new 
points of law that would make the decision a valuable precedent"), 36.2 (stating that 
appellate dispositions ordinarily will be published if the lower court or tribunal published its 
disposition), 36.3 (stating that unpublished dispositions are not binding precedent and 
permitting, although disfavoring, citation of non-precedential dispositions for persuasive 
value); ELEVENTH eIR. R. 36-1 (establishing criteria for dispositions without opinions), 36-2 
(stating that an opinion will not be published unless a majority of the panel agrees to publish 
and that unpublished opinions are not binding precedent; permitting citation to unpublished 
opinions as persuasive authority), 36-3 (permitting a panel to change the status of an opinion 
from non-precedential to precedential); D.C. eIR. R. 36 (establishing criteria for issuing 
precedential opinions, authorizing non-precedential dispositions, and permitting, but 
disfavoring, motions to publish unpublished dispositions), 28(c) (prohibiting citation of 
unpublished dispositions entered before January 1, 2002, "as precedent," and permitting 
citation of unpUblished dispositions entered after January 1,2002, "as precedent"); FED. eIR. 
R. 47.6 (authorizing non-precedential opinions, prohibiting citation to non-precedential 
opinions "as precedent," and permitting motions to reissue non-precedential opinions as 
precedential), FED. eIR. I.O.P. 10 (establishing criteria for designating opinions as 
precedential). 
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decisions will be designated as precedential or non-precedential, and rules defining 
when non-precedential opinions can be cited?6 
To understand the impact of these rules, it is important to understand some 
history.27 For over 100 years, jurists have expressed concern about the number of 
appellate opinions.28 Concerns have focused on the problems that large numbers of 
cases present for judges (difficulty keeping the docket current and staying informed 
about the law) and litigants (difficulty researching large numbers of cases and 
doctrinal inconsistency).29 The increase in the number of appellate cases from the 
1960s forward spurred action by the federal courts of appeals.3o Notwithstanding 
other justifications given, the federal appellate courts have come to rely 
significantly on the practice of issuing non-precedential opinions as a way of 
managing caseload?1 
The modem history of the non-precedential opinion begins in 1964, when the 
Judicial Conference of the United States passed a resolution providing "[t]hat the 
judges of the courts of appeals and the district courts authorize the publication of 
only those opinions which are of general precedential value.,,32 In the early 1970s, 
The Ninth Circuit's citation rule is a temporary rule. The Advisory Committee's notes 
following the rule explain that the rule was first adopted on July 1, 2000, for a limited, 30-
month period that ended December 31, 2002. The circuit extended the rule for another 30-
month period running from January 1, 2003, until July 1,2005. NINTH CIR. R. 36-3 advisory 
committee's note. 
26. See supra note 25. 
27. See generally William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential 
Precedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of 
Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1167 (1978). This was one of the first articles detailing the 
history of the development of local rules permitting the federal appellate courts to designate 
opinions as non-precedential. The history detailed in that article is confirmed in more recent 
work, including Hearings, supra note 3, at 7 (statement of Judge Alito); Martha J. Dragich, 
Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of 
Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. 
REv. 757, 762 (1995); Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the 
United States Courts of Appeals, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 199,207-08 (2001); Eloshway, 
supra note 3, at 633-35. 
28. Eloshway, supra note 3, at 633-34 (citing an address by Joseph Story, in 1 AM. 
JURIST 1, 31 (1829), that expressed the view that the volume of appeals was, at that time, 
overwhelming); see also John J. O'Connell, A Dissertation on Judicial Opinions, 23 TEMP. 
L.Q. 13, 14-15 (1949) (explaining the problem of too many appellate opinions); John B. 
Winslow, The Courts and the Papermills, 10 ILL. L. REv. 157, 158 (1915) (questioning 
whether "we are ... in danger of being overwhelmed with the rapidly rising flood of case 
law" and providing statistics on state and federal dispositions from 1909 to 1913). 
29. See supra sources cited note 28. 
30. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 27, at 1169-72. 
31. [d.; see also infra note 286; Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public 
Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUDIES 627 (1994) (using economic 
analysis to show that judges will promulgate rules that maximize their preferences even if 
the rules result in costs to litigants). Rules permitting non-precedential opinions maximize 
judges' preferences for interesting cases because they allow judges to dispose of boring or 
routine cases quickly, without much work. 
32. U.S. ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORTS 11 (1964). 
The history of non-precedential opinions from 1964 forward appears in a number of sources. 
See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 3, at 7 (statement of Judge Alito); Dragich, supra note 27, at 
760-62; Reynolds & Richman, supra note 27, at 1169-72; Eloshway, supra note 3, at 633-
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the Judicial Conference drafted a model rule on the publication of judicial 
opinions.33 By the mid-1970s, all of the federal appellate courts had rules 
establishing standards for the publication of opinions.34 Then, as now, each circuit 
had its own rule.35 Almost as soon as the nonpublication rules came into being, 
they were criticized.36 Nevertheless, the Judicial Conference concluded that the 
experiment in unpublished opinions was successful and recommended their 
continued use.37 
The experiment did, in fact, continue. Today, the vast majority of opinions 
from the federal appellate courts are designated as non-precedential. The 
percentage of opinions designated as non-precedential varies by circuit but has 
increased significantly over time in all circuits.38 Nationally, approximately 80% of 
35. All of these histories confinn the following timeline, as set out in Hannon, supra note 27, 
at 207-08: 
1964: Judicial Conference passes resolution directing federal 
district and appellate courts to limit publication of opinions to those 
"which are of general precedential value." 
1971: Federal Judicial Center report notes widespread consensus 
that too many court opinions are being published. 
1972: Federal Judicial Center recommends to Judicial Conference 
that each cirCuit review its pUblication policy and focus on limiting 
publication. Judicial Conference requests each circuit to develop and 
submit publication plans. 
1973: Advisory Council for Appellate Justice's Standards for 
Publication of Judicial Opinions report is published, containing Model 
Rule for subsequent publication rules of United States Courts of 
Appeals. 
1974: Judicial Conference receives proposed publication plans from 
courts of appeals. 
1974-1975: Commission on Revision of Federal Court Appellate 
System, operating under congressional mandate, holds hearings and 
issues report. Majority recommends selective publication and no-citation 
rules but withholds judgment and defers to Judicial Conference. 
33. See supra note 32. 
34.1d. 
35. Hearings, supra note 3, at 8 (statement of Judge Alito); Dragich, supra note 27, at 
761; see supra note 32. Practices for issuing non-precedential opinions also vary among the 
circuits. ADVISORY COMMI1TEE ON APPELLATE RULES, MINUTES OF THE FALL 2002 MEETING 
36 (Nov. 18, 2002) (as approved May 15, 2003) [hereinafter NOVEMBER MEETING] 
(summary of comments of an unnamed committee member), at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
ruleslMinutesl appl102.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2004). 
36. One of the earliest critiques of non-precedential opinions came in 1978, only a few 
years after all of the circuits promulgated rules permitting such opinions. Reynolds & 
Richman, supra note 27. 
37. Id. at 1172; Eloshway, supra note 3, at 634-35 & n.18. 
38. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts compiles annual statistics 
showing the number of non-precedential opinions issued by the federal courts of appeals. 
For the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2002, the number of non-precedential 
dispositions in cases terminated on the merits ranged from a low of 45.4% in the First 
Circuit to a high of 91.8% in the Fourth Circuit. Table S-3, U.S. Courts of Appeals-Types of 
Opinions or Orders Filed in Cases Terminated on the Merits After Oral Hearings or 
Submission on Briefs During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2002, at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002ltablesls03sep02.pdf [hereinafter Table] (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2004). Although the percentage of non-precedential opinions issued by each circuit 
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federal appellate dispositions are designated as non-precedential. 39 Thus, what 
began as an experiment has become the dominant mode of case disposition for the 
federal appellate courts. 
Over time, the nature of the opinions transformed from "unpublished," 
meaning not available in print reporters, to "non-precedential," meaning not 
binding on the courts. When print reporters were the sole means of accessing cases, 
the two terms were synonymous. The reason for declining to publish an opinion 
was to prevent parties from relying on it as precedent, an outcome dictated by the 
no-citation rules. As a practical matter, few people had access to "unpublished" 
opinions. If parties could not research or cite unpublished opinions, those opinions 
could not bind later courts.40 
Beginning in the late 1980s to early 1990s, "unpublished" opinions began to 
become available electronically through Westlaw and LexisNexis.41 Today, 
virtually all "unpublished" opinions are available via these services.42 In the late 
1990s, courts began making these opinions available themselves via court websites; 
today virtually all of the federal circuit courts make all of their opinions, 
precedential or not, available via the Internet.43 All will have to shortly, under the 
E-Government Act of 2002.44 
varies somewhat from year-to-year, the statistics for 1997 through 2002 show, overall, a 
gradual increase in the total number of non-precedential opinions: 76.5% (1997); 74.9% 
(1998); 78.1 % (1999); 79.8% (2000); 80.4% (2001); 80.5% (2002). Table 1.6, U.S. Courts of 
Appeals-Type of Opinions or Orders Filed in Cases Terminated on the Merits After Oral 
Hearings or Submission on Briefs, at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures 
Itable1.6.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2004); see also JUDITH A. MCKENNA ET AL., FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CENTER, CASE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS 21 
(2000) (showing decreasing percentages of "published" opinions in all of the federal circuits 
from 1987 through 1998). The Advisory Committee notes accompanying proposed Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, which would eliminate citation restrictions, also 
acknowledge the pervasiveness of non-precedential opinions. The notes following three 
preliminary versions of the proposed rule state that "[tlhe thirteen courts of appeals have 
cumulatively issued tens of thousands of non-precedential opinions, and about 80% of the 
opinions issued by the courts of appeals in recent years have been designated as 
non-precedential." NOVEMBER MEETING, supra note 35, at 28. 
39. Table, supra note 38. 
40. But see O'Connell, supra note 28, at 16 & n.5 (questioning whether a federal court, 
sitting in diversity, could refuse to follow an unpublished opinion from the state whose law 
controls the case and suggesting that it would be improper for the federal court to do so). 
41. Hearings, supra note 3, at 7 (statement of Judge Alito), 11-12 (statement of Judge 
Kozinski). 
42. The Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits did not originally make their non-
precedential opinions available in Westlaw or LexisNexis. MCKENNA ET AL., supra note 38, 
. at 21. Cases from these circuits also did not appear in early volumes of West's Federal 
Appendix, although now they do. See infra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Federal Appendix). Compare 1 Fed. App. vii-xxiii (2001) (listing no cases from the 3d, 5th, 
or 11 th Circuits in the table of cases reported by circuit) with 57 Fed. App. xxvi, xxiii, xxx 
(2003) (listing cases from the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits in the table of cases 
reported by circuit). 
43. Hearings, supra note 3, at 7 (statement of Judge Alito), 11-12 (statement of Judge 
Kozinski). 
44. Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899, § 205 (2002). 
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The final split between "unpublished" and non-precedential opinions came in 
2001, when West launched a new print reporter, the Federal Appendix.45 The 
Federal Appendix contains non-precedential opinions from all of the circuits. It 
truly has become doublespeak to refer to them as ''unpublished'' when they appear 
in print form. The terminology, therefore, has shifted from ''unpublished'' to 
"non-precedential.,,46 
Presently, some courts use the "non-precedential" nomenclature, while others 
continue to use the ''unpublished'' label. 47 The effect in either case, however, is the 
same. The federal appellate courts provide by local rule that they are not bound to 
follow opinions that they designate (regardless of the terminology actually used) as 
non-precedential.48 The shift, therefore, is more than just a linguistic one. The 
effect of the rules has also gradually changed over time. Rules that began as 
regulations of the form of opinions have become rules defining the precedential 
value of opinions, thereby altering the rule of horizontal stare decisis in the federal 
appellate COurts.49 
The standards for determining when an opinion will be designated as 
non-precedential vary among the circuits. 50 Most circuit rules create a presumption 
that opinions are non-precedential unless the panel deciding the case finds that it 
45. Barnett, supra note 3, at 2 (calling the publication of the Federal Appendix "a 
startling action that drains the meaning from the term 'unpublished' opinion"). 
46. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 5 (statement of Judge Alito) (calling the term 
"unpublished opinion" "somewhat misleading" and explaining that virtually all opinions 
"are published in any sense of the word" because they are available in print form, electronic 
form, or both). In one sense, the outcome of this shift is ironic. In theory, making the courts' 
opinions available should increase judicial legitimacy and accountability. Id. at 44 
(statement of Professor Arthur D. Hellman) (explaining that, by making all opinions 
available electronically, the courts recognize that making ''unpublished'' opinions readily 
accessible fosters judicial accountability). But in practice, allowing courts to designate in 
advance that the majority of opinions are not binding decreases judicial accountability by 
freeing judges from considering the future consequences of their decisions. It also reduces 
judicial legitimacy by making the decisionmaking process arbitrary, in appearance, if not in 
practice. See infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. 
47. Compare, e.g., FED. CIR. R. 47.6 (referring to "precedential" and "nonprecedential" 
dispositions) with FIRST CIR. R. 36 (referring to "published" and ''unpublished'' 
dispositions). 
48. Most local rules provide that non-precedential opinions are not binding, although 
there is some confusion over terminology in this regard. Some rules state that 
non-precedential opinions are not "precedent," while others specify that they are not 
"binding precedent." Compare, e.g., EIGHTH CIR. R. 28A(i) (stating that "[unpublished 
opinions] are not precedent") with TENTH CIR. R. 36.3 (stating that ''unpublished orders and 
judgments ... are not binding precedents"). The distinction might make sense if it hinged on 
whether the circuit prohibits citation or allows citation for persuasive value. That, however, 
is not the case. For example, the Eighth Circuit permits citation for persuasive value, yet 
simultaneously claims that unpublished decisions are "not precedent," whereas the Ninth 
Circuit's temporary rule 36-3 prohibits citation for persuasive value, yet still specifies that 
unpublished opinions are "not binding precedent," as opposed to not precedent at all. 
Nevertheless, "[a]ll courts of appeals agree that unpublished opinions are not binding 
precedent." Hearings, supra note 3, at 8 (statement of Judge Alito). 
49. See infra Part I.B (describing the effect of the rules). 
50. Hearings, supra note 3, at 57 (statement of Judge Alito) (justifying variable rules 
regarding the issuance and citation of non-precedential opinions based on the differences in 
caseloads and internal court procedures across the circuits). 
2004] A GOVERNMENT OF LAWS AND NOT MEN 721 
meets specific criteria qualifying the opinion for precedential status.51 A few 
circuits use the converse rule, presuming that an opinion will be precedential unless 
the panel designates it otherwise.52 The criteria used to make the designation vary 
among the circuits as well.53 
Nevertheless, some common themes emerge.54 Generally, opinions will be 
designated as precedential when they establish, alter, affect, criticize, or question 
existing rules of law; involve application of existing rules to unique factual 
circumstances; address matters of public concern; create conflicts with other 
circuits; or resolve conflicts among panels within the circuit.55 Opinions that do not 
meet these criteria are designated as non-precedential. 
51. FOURTH OR. R. 36(a) (providing that opinions will be published "only" if they meet 
specified criteria); SIXTH CIR. R. 206 (establishing criteria for publication; opinions are 
designated for pUblication upon the request of a panel member); SEVENTH OR. R. 53 
(providing that opinions are published only if they meet the rule's criteria because "[ilt is the 
policy of the circuit to reduce the proliferation of published opinions"); EIGHTH OR. ApP. I 
(providing that opinions should be published if they meet specific criteria); NINTH CIR. R. 
36-2 (providing that opinions are published "only" if they meet specified criteria); TENTH 
OR. R. 36.1 (permitting disposition of cases without opinions if they do "not require 
application of new points of law that would make the decision a valuable precedent"), 36.2 
(specifically providing for publication only when the lower court or tribunal's disposition 
has been published); ELEVENTH CIR. R. 36-2 (providing that opinions are "unpublished 
unless a majority of the panel decides to publish it"). It is unclear what presumption the 
District of Columbia Circuit's rule creates. The rule states that opinions are published only if 
they meet specified criteria. D.C. OR. R. 36. The rule also provides, however, that the 
court's policy is "to publish opinions ... that have general public interest." ld. It is unclear 
whether the "general public interest" standard is a presumption in favor of or against making 
opinions precedential. 
52. FIRST OR. R. 36(b) ("In general, the court thinks it desirable that opinions be 
published and thus available for citation. This policy may be overcome in some situations .. 
. . "); SECOND OR. R. 0.23 (providing that non-precedential dispositions are made when the 
decision is unanimous and all judges on the panel believe no jurisprudential purpose would 
be served by a precedential opinion); THIRD CIR. I.O.P. 5.3 (providing that opinions that 
appear to have value only to the trial court or the parties are designated as not precedential); 
FlFrH OR. R. 47.5 (providing that opinions will be published if they meet specified criteria; 
opinions are published unless each member of the panel determines that pUblication is not 
justified); FED. OR. R. 47.6 (designating opinions as precedential unless the panel 
unanimously determines that an opinion should not be precedential). Interestingly, the First 
Circuit has the strongest policy in favor of pUblication and had the lowest number of 
non-precedential opinions in 2002 (45.4%). Table, supra note 38. Even so, almost half of its 
opinions were non-precedential. 
53. Compare, e.g., FOURTH CIR. R. 36(a) (providing that an opinion will be precedential 
if it establishes or affects a rule of law within the circuit, involves a legal issue of continuing 
public interest, criticizes existing law, contains an original historical review of a legal rule, 
resolves a conflict between panels of the court, or creates a conflict with a decision in 
another circuit) with TENTH CIR. R. 36.1-36.2 (providing that the court writes opinions only 
in cases requiring an application of new points of law that would make the decision a 
valuable precedent and publishes when the opinion below has been published). 
54. Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Decisions in the Federal Couns of Appeals: 
Making the Decision to Publish, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 325, 336-39 (2001) (noting the 
general stability and consistency of non-publication rules across circuits). 
55.ld. The Fourth Circuit's criteria are typical. See supra note 53. 
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The no-citation rules also vary considerably in the restrictions they place on 
citing non-precedential opinions. Four circuits prohibit citation to non-precedential 
opinions except in proceedings related to the underlying case. 56 The other nine 
permit citation of non-precedential opinions in unrelated cases as nonbinding 
authority, although citation of non-precedential opinions is often "disfavored" even 
where it is permitted.57 
Recently, the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules submitted a new 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure, Rule 32.1, for public comment. Rule 32.1 
would eliminate citation restrictions on non-precedential opinions. The proposed 
rule provides that 
[n]o prohibition or restriction may be imposed upon the citation of 
judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that 
have been designated as "unpublished," "not for publication," 
"non-precedential" or the like, unless that prohibition or restriction is 
generally imposed upon the citation of all judicial opinions, orders, 
judgments, or other written dispositions.58 
It could be two years or more before the proposed national rule could go into 
effect,59 and there is no guarantee that the rule will make its way through the rest of 
the process with its language intact, or indeed, at all. Nevertheless, adoption of 
some national rule eliminating citation restrictions is likely for three reasons. First, 
the AnastasoJf opinion has generated sufficient publicity in legal circles that the 
courts are hard pressed to continue to ignore the situation, especially given the First 
Amendment implications of prohibiting parties from citing to the courts' own 
opinions.6O Second, although non-precedential opinions and no-citation rules have 
been on the Judicial Conference's agenda for more than ten years, this is the first 
time a proposal has been sent out for public comment,61 which is another indication 
56. The Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Federal Circuits prohibit citation. Stephen R. 
Barnett, No-Citation Rules Under Siege: A Battlefield Report and Analysis, 5 J. APP. !>RAC. 
& PROCESS 473, 475 (2003); see supra note 25. 
57. Barnett, supra note 56, at 474-75; see supra note 25. It is not clear what it means to 
"disfavor" citation, nor is it clear how much of an impediment the court's disfavor is to 
parties that want to cite non-precedential opinions. 
58. REpORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMrITEE ON APPELLATE RULES 29-30 (May 22, 2003), 
at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/app0803.pdf [hereinafter ADVISORY COMMrITEE REPORT] 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2004); see also Tony Mauro, Courts Move Forward on Citation 
Change, LEGAL TIMES, May 26, 2003, at 8. 
59. Mauro, supra note 58, at 8. 
60. Hearings, supra note 3, at 53 (statement of Professor Arthur D. Hellman) (stating 
that, although no-citation rules do not violate the First Amendment, they implicate First 
Amendment concerns); Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 3, at 1161-66 (arguing that 
no-citation rules violate the First Amendment); Salem M. Katsh & Alex V. Chachkes, 
Constitutionality of "No-Citation" Rules, 3 J. ApP. PRAC. & PROCESS 287, 297-315 (2001) 
(arguing that no-citation rules violate the First Amendment). But see Hearings, supra note 3, 
at 15 (statement of Judge Kozinski) (doubting that no-citation rules violate the First 
Amendment because courts restrict the speech of lawyers in courts in a variety of ways, 
including through prohibitions on making false statements, even if such speech would be 
constitutionally protected outside the courtroom). 
61. The federal courts began studying this issue over ten years ago: 
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that pressure for action has increased. Third, while past suggestions concerning a 
national rule governing non-precedential opinions have met with nearly uniform 
opposition from the courts, the proposed rule has met with significantly less 
opposition.62 This is not to say that the judiciary's support for the proposed rule is 
unanimous; some influential judges oppose it.63 Nevertheless, the mood has 
apparently shifted enough so that it seems likely that some type of rule eliminating 
citation restrictions on non-precedential opinions will eventually make its way into 
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
If Rule 32.1 is adopted, it will mark the first time the national rules have 
directly acknowledged the existence of non-precedential opinions.64 Opponents of 
In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee recommended that the 
Judicial Conference establish an ad hoc committee to study whether 
technological advances gave reason to reexamine the policy on 
"unpUblished" opinions. The committee did not endorse a universal 
publication policy, but it noted that "non-publication policies and 
non-citation rules present many problems." The [Judicial] Conference 
did not act on that recommendati<;Jn. 
During the past decade, amendments to the rules have been 
periodically proposed to the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules 
of Appellate Procedure to establish uniform procedures governing 
"unpublished" opinions. 
Hearings, supra note 3, at 7 (statement of Judge Alito). Aside from proposed Rule 32.1, 
none of the proposals sent to the Advisory Committee has made it through the process. 
NOVEMBER MEETING, supra note 35, at 37-38 & n.1 (noting that a proposal from 1991 to 
require the federal appellate courts to make their unpublished opinions available 
electronically was removed from the Advisory Committee's study agenda in April of 1998). 
62. Compare Hearings, supra note 3, at 7 (statement of Judge Alito) (explaining that a 
1998 survey of the chief circuit judges revealed virtually unanimous agreement that uniform 
rules regarding the issuance and citation of non-precedential opinions were unnecessary) 
with id. at 9 (statement of Judge Alito) (explaining that a survey conducted in response to a 
2001 Justice Department proposal for a uniform, national rule eliminating citation 
restrictions revealed that several courts did not object to a rule on citation, while others still 
had strong reservations) and APRIL MEETING, supra note 13, at 24 (reporting that a survey of 
chief judges of the circuits regarding a proposal for a national rule to eliminate citation 
restrictions resulted in a "decidedly mixed response," with some judges supporting the 
proposal, some opposing it, and some failing to respond). 
63. Hearings, supra note 3, at 54 (statement of Professor Arthur D. Hellman) (citing 
Michael Boudin, Chief Judge of the First Circuit, as opposing a national rule eliminating 
citation restrictions, because it would prevent each circuit from adopting procedures best 
suited to their local circumstances), 65 (statement of Judge Kozinski) (stating that 
abandonment of no-citation rules will exacerbate the problems of docket management in the 
appellate courts because if judges know their non-precedential opinions can be cited, those 
opinions will have to be more like precedential opinions). 
64. The only reference to non-precedential opinions presently in the national rules 
appears in Rule 35 concerning grounds for rehearing en banco The rule states that rehearing 
en banc is appropriate when a panel's decision is in conflict with an "authoritative" decision 
from another circuit. FED. R. APP. P. 35. The Advisory Committee notes indicate that the 
rule was amended in 1998 to refer to "authoritative" decisions rather than "published" 
decisions because of the differences among the circuits regarding the treatment of 
"unpublished," or non-precedential, opinions. The Advisory Committee notes following 
Rule 32, regarding the form of an appendix, also refer to "published" dispositions, but in the 
context of district court and agency decisions: "The rule permits inclusion not only of 
documents from the record but also copies of a printed judicial or agency decision. If a 
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the measure believe that it is the first step toward prohibiting non-precedential 
opinions.65 The Advisory Committee has taken pains to assure the federal judiciary 
that that is not the intent of the rule. The rule says nothing about whether non-
precedential opinions are permissible66 or whether non-precedential opinions are 
binding authority, persuasive authority, or fall into some other category.67 The 
Advisory Committee notes state expressly that the rule takes no position on either 
issue and affects only citation.68 One preliminary version of the rule even contained 
language authorizing non-precedential 0rinions, although the Advisory Committee 
never seriously considered that version.6 
Regardless of the Advisory Committee's intent, if the practical effect of the 
rule is to eliminate, or at least reduce the use of, non-precedential opinions, then 
that will be its effect. Opponents of the rule say that judges will have to treat non-
precedential and precedential opinions the same way if non-precedential opinions 
can be cited as precedent. This effectively changes non-precedential opinions into 
decision that is part of the record in the case has been published, it is helpful to provide a 
copy of the published decision in place of a copy of the decision from the record." FED. R. 
ApP. P. 32 advisory committee's note. 
65. "Those speaking against a national rule pointed out the following: ... Many circuit 
judges will view this as the first step on a path that will eventually lead to the abolition of 
non-precedential opinions, which are unpopular among practitioners but essential for the 
survival of the federal appellate courts." APRIL MEETING, supra note 13, at 25. 
66. Mauro, supra note 58, at 8 (saying that the Advisory Committee "sidestepped ... 
the thornier question" of the courts' ability to designate opinions as non-precedential). 
67. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (explaining how courts define the weight 
of non-precedential opinions by rule). But see Barnett, supra note 56, at 487-97 (analyzing 
proposed Rule 32.1 and arguing that its language could be interpreted to affect the weight 
that federal circuit courts accord to their non-precedential opinions). 
68. The Advisory Committee describes the limited nature of the proposed rule in its 
notes: 
Rule 32.1 is extremely limited. It takes no position on whether 
refusing to treat an "unpublished" opinion as binding precedent is 
constitutional. It does not require any court to issue an "unpublished" 
opinion or forbid any court from doing so. It does not dictate the 
circumstances under which a court may choose to designate an opinion 
as "unpublished" or specify the procedure that a court must follow in 
making that decision. It says nothing about what effect a court must give 
to one of its "unpublished" opinions or to the "unpublished" opinions of 
another court. The one and only issue addressed by Rule 32.1 is the 
citation of judicial dispositions that have been designated as 
"unpublished" or "non-precedential" by a federal or state court-
whether or not those dispositions have been published in some way or 
are precedential in some sense. 
ADVISORY COMMITIEE REpORT, supra note 58, at 33-34 (emphasis in original). 
69. Alternative A for proposed Rule 32.1 provided that "[a] court of appeals may 
designate an opinion as non-precedential." NOVEMBER MEETING, supra note 35, at 23. One 
reason this language was proposed was to reassure judges who might support a rule 
eliminating citation restrictions but for the fear that the rule would be the first step toward 
prohibiting non-precedential opinions. See id. at 23-35. Another reason was that proposing a 
broader rule than it would likely approve would give the Committee room for compromise 
later in the process. [d. at 35. The Advisory Committee rejected this language almost 
immediately, saying it did not want to pronounce by rule that such opinions are, in fact, 
constitutional. [d. Thus, it does not seem that this language was ever intended to be included 
in the rule, nor was it considered seriously by the Advisory Committee. 
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precedential opinions.7o It is true that, under the proposed rule, federal appellate 
courts will still be able to decide cases at variance with prior non-precedential 
opinions without running afoul of the principle of horizontal stare decisis. It is also 
true that this will be more difficult to do when parties are permitted to cite 
non-precedential opinions. As a practical matter, it may be difficult for courts to 
maintain their legitimacy while rejecting prior opinions solely on the ground that 
they are non-precedential, and therefore, not binding. If parties are able to cite 
non-precedential opinions, courts are likely to feel constrained to distinguish or 
otherwise grapple with those opinions if the courts choose not to follow them.71 
Ironically, however, contrary to the fears of its opponents, the language of the 
proposed rule as submitted for public comment may have the opposite effect. By 
implicitly recognizing the validity of non-precedential opinions, the proposed rule 
may further entrench the practice of issuing them. As noted above, the Advisory 
Committee attempts to sidestep the question of the courts' ability to issue non-
precedential opinions in the notes accompanying the proposal, which emphasize 
the limited nature of the rule. Nevertheless, the notes may not overcome the 
implication that the rule itself creates. 
The rule is stated in the negative (no prohibition or restriction may be 
imposed), but the effect is affirmatively to authorize the citation of 
non-precedential opinions. The very fact that the proposed rule authorizes citation 
to such opinions acts as an implicit acceptance of the practice of issuing them, if 
not an endorsement of it. Although some Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 
prohibit parties and courts from taking certain actions,n none provide procedures 
for regulating impermissible practices. 
By permitting citation to non-precedential opinions, the rule creates the 
inference that those opinions can validly be issued. If courts were not permitted to 
issue non-precedential opinions, why would a rule affirmatively permitting citation 
to them exist? If, in fact, courts were not permitted to issue non-precedential 
opinions, the appropriate rule would be one eliminating those opinions, not a rule 
permitting citation to them.73 
70. Judge Kozinski's view on this issue is typical: "If unpublished dispositions could be 
cited as precedent, conscientious judges would have to pay much closer attention to their 
precise wording. Language that might be adequate when applied to a particular case might 
well be unacceptable if applied to future cases raising different fact patterns." Hearings, 
supra note 3, at 13. The effect would be for judges to treat all of the opinions they write as 
precedential. See id. 
71. Barnett, supra note 3, at 12 (expressing the opinion that allowing citation of non-
precedential opinions will cause them to be followed more often than if they cannot be 
cited). 
72. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 26(b) (prohibiting courts from extending time to file 
notice of appeal); FED. R. APP. P. 47(b) (prohibiting courts from imposing sanctions for 
violation of procedural requirements not contained in a statute, national rule, or local rule 
unless the party has actual notice of the requirement). 
73. The Advisory Committee uses an express statement to contradict the conclusion 
that the rule creates by implicature. Implicature is a linguistic process people use to fill in the 
implied blanks in a conversation. Take, for example, a conversation in which someone says, 
"Would you like a cup of coffee?" and the response is, "Does the sun set in the west?" 
Implicature is the process by which the speaker understands that the answer to the response 
question (yes) is the implied answer to the question that the speaker posed. False implicature 
occurs when the answer to the response question is not the truthful answer to the question 
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The problem is that the Advisory Committee is attempting to use its notes to 
avoid the implication of the rule. Because Advisory Committee notes are entitled to 
weight in interpreting procedural rules/4 some courts have been willing to read 
limitations into federal rules based on the notes. 75 Others, however, have not. 76 
Because the Advisory Committee notes do not have the same force that the rules 
do, courts may not be willing to use them to create a meaning for a rule that the 
language of the rule itself does not support. 
The Advisory Committee's disclaimer may also be ineffective because it 
cannot overcome the effect of the interplay between the proposed rule and Rule 47. 
Rule 47 provides that local rules cannot contravene national rules.77 The Advisory 
Committee notes to the 1995 amendments to Rule 47 state that local circuit rules 
"may not bar any practice that these rules explicitly or implicitly permit.,,78 When 
the national rules were silent on non-precedential opinions, local rules providing 
for their issuance did not contravene the national rules. Once the national rules 
address the topic, however, the local and national rules must be read in concert. If 
the national rules affirmatively permit the citation of non-precedential opinions, 
then that must mean that their issuance does not contravene the national rules. It 
would be contradictory for the national rules to prohibit the issuance of 
non-precedential opinions while simultaneously authorizing the citation of them. 
Accordingly, by operation of Rule 47, the implication of proposed Rule 32.1 is that 
local rules authorizing the designation of opinions as non-precedential are valid. 
Indeed, Rule 32.1 could operate to prohibit circuits from prohibiting non-
precedential opinions because doing so would bar a practice that Rule 32.1 
implicitly permits. Of course, the proposed rule does not require the federal 
appellate courts to issue non-precedential opinions; it would merely operate to 
posed. Thus, if a prosecutor asks a witness, "Did you see the defendant brandish a gun?" and 
the witness answers, "I was there, wasn't IT', the answer to the second question (yes) mayor 
may not be the truthful answer to the question posed. If it is not the truthful answer, the 
witness has engaged in false implicature, even though she has not made an overtly false 
statement. See Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Shooting From the Lip: United States v. 
Dickerson, Role [/m]morality, and the Ethics of Legal Rhetoric, 23 U. HAw. L. REV. 1, 
15-17 (2000). The Advisory Committee's comment does not constitute false implicature. 
Rather, it appears to be an attempt to avoid the effect of principles of implicature. 
74. Miss. Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1946). 
75. E.g., Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Pa., 975 F.2d 102, 108 
(3d Cir. 1992) (relying in part on Advisory Committee comments limiting the permissible 
scope of district court local rulemaking power to determine that the local rule at issue was 
invalid). 
76. E.g., Whitehouse v. United States District Court, 53 F.3d 1349, 1364-65 (1st Cir. 
1995) (stating that Advisory Committee comments to federal rules "cannot change the 
unambiguous language of a duly adopted federal Rule"); see also id. at 1358 n.12 ("[T]he 
Comment [to a federal rule] cannot substantively change the text of the rule."). In that case, 
the court determined that a limitation on local rulemaking power that appeared in a comment 
but not in the rule itself could not limit the district court's rulemaking power. [d. at 1365. 
77. FED. R. APP. P. 47. 
78. FED. R. ApP. P. 47 advisory committee's notes (1995 amendment). In the case of 
Rule 47, the Advisory Committee notes do not attempt to create a meaning for the rule that 
is unsupported by its language, as opposed to the situation with the notes accompanying 
proposed Rule 32.1, which attempt to change the meaning of the text of the rule. 
Accordingly, the notes accompanying Rule 47 are entitled to weight in interpreting that 
rule's meaning. See Miss. Publ'g Corp., 326 U.S. at 444 (stating that Advisory Committee 
comments are entitled to weight in interpreting federal procedural rules). 
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prevent those courts from prohibiting them. Moreover, if a court were to determine 
that non-precedential opinions are unconstitutional, the constitutional ruling would 
trump the provisions of the rule. This is not likely to become an issue unless and 
until one of the federal circuits affirmatively attempts to prohibit non-precedential 
opinions through its local rules or through adjudication on non-constitutional 
grounds, an event that is unlikely to happen anytime soon. 
At present, the local rules of the federal appellate courts authorize the issuance 
of non-precedential opinions; set the criteria for determining which opinions will 
be designated as non-precedential; define the weight of non-precedential opinions; 
and limit, to greater or lesser degrees, parties' ability to cite non-precedential 
opinions. It seems likely that proposed national Rule 32.1, which eliminates the 
citation restrictions, or some version of it will be adopted. Although the proposed 
rule implicitly accepts the practice of issuing non-precedential opinions, it does not 
regulate the practice in any way. Thus, the local rules remain the principal 
mechanism that the federal appellate COllrts use to manage the practice of 
designating the majority of their opinions as non-precedential. These rules allow 
the federal appellate courts selectively to opt out of the principles of horizontal 
stare decisis, as explained in the next section. 
B. The Effect of Non-Precedential Opinions on Horizontal Stare Decisis 
The federal appellate courts' local rules governing non-precedential opinions 
alter the principle of horizontal stare decisis because they operate as the mirror 
image of that principle.79 Horizontal stare decisis is a rule defining prospectively 
the weight of a judicial opinion and is a rule to which the federal appellate courts 
say they generally adhere. That is, they are bound to follow prior opinions of earlier 
panels within the circuit, with limited exceptions. so The prerogative of overruling a 
79. As explained in note 6, supra, horizontal stare decisis refers to the requirement that 
courts within the same jurisdiction and at the same level adhere to their own prior decisions. 
80. Every circuit follows this rule. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 123 F.3d 695, 
697 n.2 (lst Cir. 1997); United States v. King, 276 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2002); In re Cont'l 
Airlines, Inc., 279 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2002); Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 312-
13 n.4 (4th Cir. 2001); Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., 254 F.3d 573, 577 (5th Cir. 2001); 
Valentine v. Francis, 270 F.3d 1032, 1035 (6th Cir. 2001); Brooks v. Walls, 279 F.3d 518, 
522 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Pollard, 249 F.3d 738, 739 (8th Cir. 2001); Hart v. 
Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1171 (9th Cir. 2001); Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 912 
n.8 (10th Cir. 1997); Walker v. S. Co. Servs., Inc., 279 F.3d 1289, 1293 (lIth Cir. 2002); 
Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2001); 
Brubaker Amusement Co. v. United States, 304 F.3d 1349, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Alan R. 
Gilbert, Annotation, In Banc Proceedings in Federal Courts of Appeals, 37 A.L.R. FED. 274, 
at § 5 (1978 & Supp. 2003) (collecting cases); see also Union Pac. R.R. v. City of Atoka, 6 
Fed. App. 725, 730 (10th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the scope of prior precedent for 
purposes of adhering to an earlier panel decision includes not only the holding, but also the 
reasoning). Union Pacific'S exposition of the meaning of horizontal stare decisis would not 
be binding on later Tenth Circuit panels because it comes from a non-precedential opinion. 
The courts recognize an exception to the general rule when a later ruling by the 
Supreme Court, the circuit court sitting en banc, or a state's courts (on questions of state 
law) affects the continued validity of a prior panel decision. See, e.g., Martin, 254 F.3d at 
577 (overruling of a prior panel's decision was unequivocally directed by controlling 
Supreme Court precedent); United States v. Doe, 819 F.2d 206, 209 n.l (9th Cir. 1985) 
(stating that, when an earlier panel decision has been undermined by a later en banc 
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prior panel's decision belongs to the court sitting en banc.81 The local rules 
authorizing individual panels to declare prospectively that their opinions are not 
precedential allow the federal appellate courts to sidestep this requirement and 
make participation in the entire system of precedent discretionary. 
To understand the relationship between the local rules and stare decisis, it is 
necessary to parse the elements of rules prospectively defining the weight of a 
judicial opinion. Rules defining the weight of a judicial opinion involve two 
tribunals: the deciding court, which issues a decision in a case, and the applying 
court, which is a later court that has to decide whether to apply the deciding court's 
decision. In addition, rules defining the weight of a judicial opinion consist of two 
components: a general determination of the weight of the opinion based on its 
source within the court system82 and a specific determination of the weight of the 
decision based on its content. 83 These elements are common both to stare decisis 
and local court rules authorizing non-precedential opinions. 84 
decision, a later panel is free to reexamine the earlier panel decision); Cooper v. Cent. & 
Southwest Servs., 271 F.3d 1247, 1251 (lOth Cir. 2001) (stating that a panel must adhere to 
a prior panel's interpretation of state law, unless the state's courts have changed the law 
since the prior panel issued its decision). 
Circuit courts also occasionally recognize ad hoc exceptions if circumstances so 
warrant. See, e.g., N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036, 1044-45 (4th Cir. 1977) 
(determining that the panel was not bound to follow prior precedent when disqualification of 
all but one of the active circuit judges in the circuit prevented en banc review and quoting 
language from the Supreme Court that "stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a 
mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision"). But see Charleston v. United 
States, 444 F.2d 504, 505 (9th Cir. 1971) (refusing to overrule a prior panel decision without 
rehearing en banc even though such a rehearing was not possible because of the timing of 
the case). 
81. See supra note 80; 28 U.S.C. § 46 (2000) (providing procedures for en banc 
review); FED. R. APP. P. 35 (providing additional procedures for en banc review). 
82. Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571,576 (1987) (explaining that 
rules of precedent presuppose rules regarding the status of the prior decision). "If a pure 
argument from precedent is valid, the earlier decision has a status that must be respected by 
a later decisionmaker, and that status is imposed by the rule of precedent independent of 
other status differentials." Id. 
83. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (7th ed. 1999) (defining stare decisis as the 
requirement that courts must follow prior decisions "when the same points arise again in 
litigation"). Thus, there is a content-based aspect of stare decisis. Courts routinely 
distinguish prior cases on the facts. See also Hearings, supra note 3, at 68 (letter from Alcan 
Aluminum Corp.) (noting that prior decisions that are not factually analogous to a pending 
case have never been binding on the court deciding the pending case); Schauer, supra note 
82, at 576-79 (describing context-dependency and explaining how rules of relevance help a 
decisionmaker determine whether a prior decision with status requiring respect must in fact 
be applied in a later situation). 
84. Michael Stokes Paulsen describes the process somewhat differently, referring to the 
"information" and "disposition" (decision-altering) functions of stare decisis. Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the 
Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE LJ. 1535, 1544 (2000). Using his 
terminology, the local rules give the deciding court the discretion to remove the disposition 
(decision-altering) aspect of its decision by making it non-precedential. The no-citation rules 
then operate to remove the information aspect of the decision by prohibiting parties from 
bringing the decision to the applying court's attention. See also Hearings, supra note 3, at 52 
(statement of Professor Arthur D. Hellman) (discussing the informational aspect of prior 
precedents, including nonbinding precedents). 
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Under the principles of stare decisis, the applying court controls the 
determination of the weight of a prior decision. The applying court first makes a 
generic determination about the weight of the prior decision based on its source.85 
The applying court then makes a specific determination about the weight of the 
prior decision based on its content. If the content of the prior decision is 
sufficiently different from that of the pending case, the applying court will not be 
bound to follow it. If the content of the prior decision is sufficiently similar to the 
case at bar, the applying court will be bound to follow it.86 
Under the provisions of the local rules authorizing non-precedential opinions, 
the process is reversed, and the control over the determination of the weight of an 
opinion shifts from the applying court to the deciding COurt.87 The deciding court 
first makes a specific determination about a pending case based on its content. 88 
This content-based specific determination then becomes the basis for the deciding 
court's generic determination about the weight its opinion resolving the case should 
have.89 If the content is such that the pending case is not important, interesting, or 
novel, as defined by the local rules, then the decision will not be binding on future 
applying courts and often cannot even be cited to them.90 If the content of the case 
is such that it is important, interesting, or novel, then the decision qualifies for stare 
decisis treatment by later applying courts. 91 
In practice, of course, deciding courts have always had some control over the 
way their opinions were used by applying courts through control over the content 
85. For example, federal appellate courts are bound to follow the decisions of earlier 
panels within the circuit, but are not obligated to follow decisions from federal district 
courts, other circuits, or state courts. Thus, the court must first evaluate the source of an 
opinion to see whether it is one the court is obligated to follow. 
86. See supra note 83. 
87. The deciding court cannot control the wayan applying court will characterize the 
deciding court's opinion. If the opinion is binding, therefore, the deciding court will be 
concerned about that future characterization; by announcing prospectively that its decision is 
not binding, the deciding court relieves itself of concern over future characterizations of its 
decisions. "[O]ne who worries about establishing a precedent . . . has in mind a 
characterization that the future will give to today's action, some category within which 
tomorrow's decisionmaker will place today's facts .... The power of precedent depends 
upon some assimilation between the event at hand and some other event." Schauer, supra 
note 82, at 579. Thus, goes the argument, non-precedential opinions increase efficiency by 
allowing the courts to rule without the need to craft language that is most likely to result in 
the future characterization that the deciding court prefers. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 3, 
at 14 (statement of Judge Kozinski) (explaining that, when judges write precedential 
opinions, a significant amount of the time devoted to drafting the opinion is spent making 
the reasoning consistent with prior precedent and useful for the resolution of future cases). 
88. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (discussing typical criteria in local 
rules for designating opinions precedential or non-precedential). These are content-based 
criteria. 
89. [d. If the content of the case falls within the prescribed categories, the deciding 
court designates the opinion as non-precedential, thereby conferring the generic status of 
non-precedential on the opinion. 
90. [d. Even if the citation restrictions were eliminated, the deciding court would still be 
empowered under the local rules to designate an opinion as non-precedential, which still 
shifts the determination about the weight of the decision from the applying court to the 
deciding court. 
91. [d. 
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of the OpInIOn. That is, the deciding coUrt could always provide so little 
information (in the extreme case, a one-word disposition) that the opinion would be 
of no value to the applying court.92 The fact remains, however, that the applying 
court would not ignore the deciding court's opinion on the basis of the deciding 
court's prospective determination that the opinion was not binding; rather, the 
applying court would determine at the specific determination step that the prior 
opinion did not contain sufficient information for it to be useful to the applying 
court in resolving the pending case. 
From a structural perspective, the local rules process does not completely 
supplant stare decisis because the deciding court can choose to give its opinion 
stare decisis treatment. 93 Indeed, deciding courts could make that choice in every 
case, thereby effectively circumventing the local rules and maintaining traditional 
principles of stare decisis. The difference, however, is that the local rules change 
the relationship between courts at the same level by shifting the control over the 
determination of the weight of an opinion away from the applying court and to the 
deciding court. In that sense, the local rules expressly modify stare decisis 
principles by making stare decisis discretionary with the deciding court. The local 
rules operate structurally to make stare decisis an "opt in" system, with the control 
over whether to opt in vested in the deciding court. Moreover, with approximately 
eighty percent of decisions designated as non-precedential, it is clear that the 
federal a.gpellate courts do not choose the stare decisis option in the vast majority 
of cases. 
Although the local rules have both structural and practical implications, in 
practice, the result in most cases is the same as it would be under traditional stare 
decisis rules most of the time. That is, if an applying court agrees with the prior 
decision of the deciding court, it will apply the decision. Using the principles of 
stare decisis, this is the expected and normal result. With opinions designated as 
non-precedential, the applying court will either state that it is persuaded by the 
deciding court's opinion even though it is not bound by the opinion or it will ignore 
the deciding court's opinion but reach the same result. 
Even if the applying court does not agree with the deciding court, most of the 
time the result will still be the same under both processes. That is, even applying 
the rule of horizontal stare decisis, the applying court will often be able to 
distinguish the deciding court's opinion on the facts at the specific determination 
step of the process. With opinions designated as non-precedential, the applying 
court need not do anything to avoid applying the deciding court's opinion; it is free 
simply to ignore the deciding court's opinion by virtue of the fact that the deciding 
92. See, e.g., SECOND CrR. R. 0.23 (authorizing summary dispositions); EIGHTH CIR. 
APP. I (authorizing disposition without opinion). 
93. Some circuit rules expressly state that the panel that decides the case also 
determines whether the opinion will be precedential or non-precedential. FIRST CIR. R. 36; 
SECOND CIR. R. 0.23; FOURTH OR. R. 36(a); FrFTH CrR. R. 47.5; SIXTH CIR. R. 206; 
SEVENTH CIR. R. 53; EIGHTH CIR. APP. I; ELEVENTH CIR. R. 36-2; FED. OR. R. 47.6. Some 
circuit rules do not expressly state that the deciding panel makes the determination about the 
precedential status of its own opinions, but the implication from the rules is that that is the 
case. See THIRD CIR. I.O.P. 5.3; NINTH OR. R. 36-1; TENTH OR. R. 36.1 & 36.2; D.C. OR. 
R.36. 
94. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
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court designated its opinion as non-precedential, and therefore, not binding on the 
applying court. 
The only time the two processes render different results is when the applying 
court does not agree95 with the deciding court but is unable to distinguish the 
deciding court's opinion. The situation when courts have to apply precedent with 
which they do not agree is really the only time when courts actually are bound b~ 
authority as authority, that is, are constrained by a precedent because of its status. 6 
The rest of the time, if courts are persuaded that prior decisions are correct, it does 
not matter whether the determination is that those decisions are binding or 
nonbinding.97 
95. Lack of agreement may even be too strong a way to describe this situation. Stare 
decisis constrains decisionmaking when the applying court might (if writing on a clean slate) 
choose a different rule or outcome in the pending case than it would if it were constrained by 
a deciding court's prior decision, even if the applying court does not disagree with the 
deciding court or believe that the deciding court's prior decision was affirmatively incorrect. 
Incorrect decisions present thorny problems in relation to stare decisis, see generally Caleb 
Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REv. 1 (2001), 
but more at the Supreme Court level than at the circuit court level. Rehearing en bane and 
appeal to the Supreme Court, although not perfect and not generally intended for error 
correction, are mechanisms that can provide some check on decisionmaking at the circuit 
court level. 
96. Stare decisis also constrains judicial decisionmaking when judges are uncertain 
about the correct answer. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and External Costs and 
Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENTL. REv. 93, 95 (1989). 
97. Frederick Schauer, The Authority of Legal Scholarship, l39 U. PA. L. REv. 1003, 
lO05-06 (1991). As Schauer explains: 
[A]n argument for obedience to authority is an argument for taking some 
directive as a reason for action (or reason for decision) because of its 
source rather than because of its content. 
This is not to say that we do not frequently take directives seriously 
because of their content. But when we do so, it is because we are 
persuaded by that content rather than by its source. The notion of 
content-independence is designed to reflect the difference between the 
soldier who stops because a colleague has pointed out to him the 
presence of a mine and the soldier who stops because a sergeant has 
ordered him to do so. When the colleague says "Stop!" and no more, the 
soldier's fIrst response is likely to be "Why?," requesting a reason other 
than the mere issuance of the directive for complying with its mandates. 
But when the sergeant says "Stop!," any good soldier knows that the last 
thing you say is "Why?" 
The distinction between authority and persuasion, therefore, is 
content-independent and source-based. When the source rather than the 
content of a directive is a reason for taking its indications as a reason for 
action, an argument from authority in the strict sense exists. 
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see also John Harrison, The Power of Congress 
Over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503, 508 (2000) ("Norms of precedent have 
decisive force precisely when the court would have come out the other way had it not been 
following precedent."); Hearings, supra note 3, at 51 (statement of Professor Arthur D. 
Hellman) (explaining that a contrary authority on a point of law only constrains the deciding 
court in the rare case when three circumstances exist: (a) the earlier panel announces a new 
rule of law; (b) the statement of the new rule was essential to the outcome of the case; and 
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If the result under either system is the same most of the time, why should we 
care about the limited circumstances under which the results will differ? If the 
federal appellate courts are going to operate using the rule of horizontal stare 
decisis, the times when the applying court does not agree with a prior deciding 
court is exactly when that rule should apply. The principle of stare decisis is a 
"basic self-governing principle" that acts as a check on arbitrary decisionmaking.98 
A system that permits the courts to exempt some opinions from this self-governing 
mechanism allows applying courts to make arbitrary decisions because they can 
ignore prior opinions on an unreasoned basis, or no basis at all. This is the very 
type of arbitrary discretion that led the Framers to believe that courts should be 
bound by precedent in the first instance.99 The present system also allows deciding 
courts to make arbitrary decisions when they know their decisions will not 
constrain future decisionmakers. 100 
In addition, the present system undermines the legitimacy of the courtS. 101 This 
would be the case even if the present system never led the federal appellate courts 
actually to make any arbitrary decisions, which is an unlikely scenario under any 
adjudicatory system, given human fallibility. The ease with which the present 
system allows the federal appellate courts to disregard their prior opinions creates 
the perception of arbitrary decisionmaking. The present system also undermines the 
legitimacy of the courts by creating a conflict of interest for deciding courts. This 
conflict arises because the rules allow the same court that resolves an individual 
case on the merits to decide for itself the weight its decision will have for future 
applying courts. Moreover, for the federal appellate courts to say they will follow 
the principle of horizontal stare decisis while simultaneously employing rules that 
allow them to ignore the majority of their own decisions raises legitimacy 
concerns. Indeed, one could argue that it would be preferable for them expressly to 
abandon the principle of horizontal stare decisis than to continue the present 
system. Although that might not resolve concerns about arbitrary decisionmaking, 
it would at least reflect more accurately the weight the federal appellate courts 
actually accord to the majority of their opinions. 
(c) adhering to the new rule in a pending case would require the court to reach a different 
decision than it would otherwise reach). 
98. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) ("[I]t is indisputable 
that stare decisis is a basic self-governing principle within the Judicial Branch, which is 
entrusted with the sensitive and difficult task of fashioning and preserving a jurisprudential 
system that is not based upon 'an arbitrary discretion. "') (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 
502-03 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000). 
99. ''To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should 
be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty 
in every particular case that comes before them .... " THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 502-03 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000). 
100. Schauer, supra note 82, at 579 (explaining that the resolution of a matter is 
affected by the knowledge that a future decisionmaker will make use of the precedent). In 
this regard, non-precedential opinions are especially problematic in death penalty cases. 
David R. Dow & Bridget T. McNeese, Invisible Executions: A Preliminary Analysis of 
Publication Rates in Death Penalty Cases in Selected Jurisdictions, 8 TEx. J. ON C.L. & 
C.R. 149, 151-52 (2003). When courts issue non-precedential opinions denying relief in 
death penalty cases, they "can write tendentious, sloppy opinions because there is no one left 
alive who has an interest in holding them up to shame." Id. at 152. 
101. Healy, supra note 3, at 106 (noting that the Constitution requires a legitimate 
judiciary for the government to function). 
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Certainly, a system of precedent need not and should not require absolute 
adherence to prior decisions. If applying courts were unyieldingly obligated to 
follow prior opinions, the law would become calcified and the balance between 
consistency and fairness that stare decisis seeks to achieve would tilt too far toward 
the consistency side of the scale.102 Any generally applicable rule of horizontal 
stare decisis that the courts adopt must be flexible enough to allow for exceptions 
to the rule and changes to the law in appropriate cases. But when the decision about 
whether to participate in the system of precedent at all is made selectively by the 
same court that issues a decision, there is a serious risk that the consistency element 
will fall off the scale altogether. 
The present effort to eliminate citation restrictions does not solve this problem. 
Although eliminating citation restrictions can make it difficult for a panel 
completely to disregard a prior non-precedential opinion that is on point with a 
pending case, the panel still will be able to do so. Moreover, an opinion in conflict 
with a prior non-precedential opinion may itself be non-precedential, which then 
allows the next panel facing the issue to disregard both opinions and take yet a 
third approach to an issue. If the third opinion is non-precedential, this compounds 
the problem further. Eliminating citation restrictions, although laudable, leaves this 
system intact. 
Because the mechanism for making participation in the system of precedent 
discretionary comes from local procedural rules, the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure seem to be a natural vehicle to consider for eliminating the mechanism 
nationally. The submission of proposed Rule 32.1 for public comment shows that 
national regulation is a possibility. Although that rule would affect only citation 
restrictions and would not affect the issuance of non-precedential opinions, its 
approval would open the door for further national regulation of the practice. In 
evaluating the possibility of regulating non-precedential opinions through the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, it is important to consider the permissible 
scope of those rules. Part II addresses that issue. 
II. THE NATIONAL RULEMAKING PROCESS: AN EXERCISE IN DELEGATED 
LEGIS LA TIVE AUTHORITY 
Procedure in the federal courts is regulated in three ways: by federal statutes, 
by national rules, and by local rules. The national rules of procedure, including the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Bankruptcy, Evidence, and 
Appellate Procedure, hold a unique status in American law. Although the federal 
102. A system of adherence to precedent requires some flexibility. The doctrine of stare 
decisis entails tensions that make strict adherence to all prior decisions all of the time 
unwise. Sometimes the goals of stability and legitimacy from adherence to prior decisions 
are in conflict with the goal of accurate judicial opinions. Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in 
Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 V AND. L. REv. 
647, 652-55 (1999); see also Macey, supra note 96, at 93 (noting that principles of stare 
decisis reflect the common law's primordial tension between change and stability). Stare 
decisis cannot require blind adherence to decisions that are clearly incorrect. Doing so would 
undermine the courts' legitimacy, which is a principal goal of the doctrine and which 
depends at least to some degree on the courts' ability to correct past erroneous decisions. 
Conversely, however, if an exception to the doctrine allowed courts to reexamine all prior 
precedents in every case, the exception would swallow the rule. Lee, supra, at 654. 
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courts have inherent authority in the absence of congressional action to regulate 
procedure, Congress also has the authority to regulate procedure and has 
established a mechanism through the Rules Enabling Act for the adoption of 
procedural rules. 103 Procedural rules ptomulgated by the courts and adopted 
pursuant to this mechanism are subject to congressional review, and therefore, have 
statutory characteristics without actually being statutes. 104 Conse~uently, they have 
been characterized as a "quasi-judicial/statutory Frankenstein.,,10 Notwithstanding 
their hybrid character, national procedural rules, including the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, are promulgated pursuant to delegated legislative authority, 
and therefore, are fundamentally creatures of legislative power. 106 When the federal 
courts regulate procedure through the statutory rulemaking process, they act in a 
legislative capacity and cannot promulgate national rules that exceed Congress's 
legislative power. 
Congress has the authority to regulate procedure in the courts as a "necessary 
implication" of its power to create tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court, as well 
as by virtue of the Necessary and Proper Clause, which expressly confers on 
Congress the power to make laws to execute the judicial power.107 Congress has 
delegated this authority to the United States Supreme Court to promulgate national 
103.28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-77 (2000). 
104. See infra notes 116-21, describing the statutory character of procedural rules. 
Procedural rules have been analogized to administrative regulations promulgated by 
executive agencies pursuant to delegated authority. Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Federal 
Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 905,928-29 (1976). The analogy is not 
perfect, however, because, unlike executive agencies that have no power to act beyond what 
is delegated to them, federal courts have an independent source of power to act in Article ill 
of the Constitution. 
105. E-mail from James G. Scott, Assistant Counsel, United States Senate, Office of the 
Legislative Counsel, to Amy E. Sloan (Mar. 25, 2003) (on file with the author). 
106. See infra notes 119-24 and accompanying text. 
107. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941) (citing Wayman v. Southard, 
among other sources, to establish Congress's power to regulate federal court procedure); 
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 22 (1825) (explaining that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause gives Congress the authority to regulate court procedures). David Engdahl has 
argued that Congress has no power by necessary implication of the Tribunals Clause because 
that clause gives Congress only the power to establish lower courts, and nothing more. 
David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress' Power Regarding the Judicial Branch, 1999 
BYU L. REv. 75, 104-19. The Supreme Court has accepted the "necessary implication" of 
the Tribunals Clause as a source of Congress's power to regulate procedure, but seems to 
construe its scope as co-extensive with that of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Willy v. 
Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136 (1992) (upholding district court's imposition of Rule 11 
sanctions in a case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by saying that the Tribunals Clause, 
"Article I, § 8, cl. 9, authorizes Congress to establish the lower federal courts. From almost 
the founding days of this country, it has been fumJ.y established that Congress, acting 
pursuant to its authority to make all laws 'necessary and proper' to their establishment, also 
may enact laws regulating the conduct of those courts and the means by which their 
judgments are enforced.") (footnote omitted); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) 
(explaining that "the constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to make rules governing 
the practice and pleading in those courts"); see also Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: 
Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 18 CaNST. COMMENT. 191, 198 
(2001). 
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procedural rules for the federal courts through the Rules Enabling Act. 108 This 
delegation traces its history to the early days of the United States. 109 Congress fIrst 
delegated rulemaking authority to the Supreme Court in the Judiciary Act of 
1789."0 This authority was "reaffIrmed and strengthened" in legislation enacted in 
1842." 1 The Supreme Court failed to act on this authority, however, which led to 
procedural confusion in the federal courts.ll2 Accordingly, in the Conformity Act 
of 1872, Congress withdrew the delegation of authority and required federal courts 
to use state court procedures, "any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding ... 
• ,,113 The Conformity Act failed to achieve its purpose of making federal and state 
court procedures uniform for a variety of reasons, including the fact that the 
Constitution and federal statutes that superseded state procedural rules governed 
some actions in federal court. 114 Thus, it was not a satisfactory solution to the 
federal courts' procedural diffIculties. After several unsuccessful attempts, 
Congress renewed its delegation of statutory rulemaking authority to the courts in 
the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 115 and that Act continues to govern rule making in 
the federal courts today. 
Under the Rules Enabling Act, the federal judiciary promulgates national 
procedural rules. Congress then reviews the rules; unless Congress acts within a 
108. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2000) (''The Supreme Court shall have the power to 
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the 
United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and 
courts of appeals."). The rulemaking process has many steps. Generally, one of five 
Advisory Committees appointed by the Judicial Conference considers new or amended rules. 
If the Advisory Committee approves the new or amended rule, it then goes before the 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, commonly known as the "Standing 
Committee." If the Standing Committee approves the rule, it then goes before the Judicial 
Conference. If the Judicial Conference approves the rule, it is then submitted to the Supreme 
Court. If the Supreme Court approves the rule, it transmits the rule to Congress pursuant to 
the Rules Enabling Act. Congress then has six months to review the rule. If Congress does 
not act, the new or amended rule goes into effect. If Congress does not approve the rule, it 
must act legislatively to reject, modify, or defer the rule. Thus, although the federal judiciary 
is functionally responsible for promulgating the rules, its authority is "subject to the ultimate 
legislative right of the Congress" to change or reject the rules. Leonidas Ralph Mecham, The 
Rulemaking Process: A Summary for the Bench and Bar, at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/ 
proceduresum.htm (last visited May 27, 2003); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-77 (2000). 
109. For a comprehensive treatment of the pre-1934 history of rulemaking in the federal 
courts, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015 
(1982). A shorter history appears in Weinstein, supra note 104, at 916-22. 
110. Weinstein, supra note 104, at 916 (citing the Judiciary Act of 1789, Act of Sept. 
24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73). 
111. Burbank, supra note 109, at 1040 & n.103 (citing the Act of Aug. 23, 1842, ch. 
188, § 6, 5 Stat. 516,518); accord Weinstein, supra note 104, at 919 (citing the same Act 
and noting that the Act was a reaffirmation of the federal courts' delegated rulemaking 
power). 
112. Burbank, supra note 109, at 1039-41; see also Weinstein, supra note 104, at 918-
20 (noting that, although the Supreme Court made limited efforts at rulemaking in equity, 
admiralty, and bankruptcy, it failed to promulgate rules of civil procedure from 1789 to 
1872, when Congress withdrew delegated rulemaking authority in the Conformity Act). 
113. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197. 
114. Burbank, supra note 109, at 1040. 
115.1d. at 1045-95 (detailing efforts from 1906 to 1934 to convince Congress to renew 
its delegation of rulemaking authority to the courts). 
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prescribed period of time, the rules become effective as submitted to Congress, I 16 
and they are published as part of the United States Code. 117 They are not presented 
to the President for signature or veto. liS Although Congress can amend existing or 
proposed rules by statute, the rules themselves are not true "statutes.,,119 
Nevertheless, because they flow from Congress's legislative power, they have the 
force of statutes l20 and are valid only to the extent that they implement 
congressional or legislative policy. 121 The "abrogation clause" of the Rules 
Enabling Act also confers statutory weight on the national procedural rules. That 
clause provides that "[a]lllaws in conflict with such [national] rules shall be of no 
further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.,,122 When a national rule 
and a federal statute conflict, the courts apply traditional principles of statutory 
interpretation to resolve the conflict, treating the national rule and statute with 
equivalent force. 123 Thus, national procedural rules are legislative in character. 124 
116.28 U.S.c. §§ 2071-77 (2000). 
117. In U.S.C., the rules are published with Title 28 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure) 
as an Appendix. U.S.C.A. also publishes them as an Appendix to Title 28. In U.S.C.S., they 
are appended to the end of the code in separate "Rules" volumes. 
118. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (Presentment Clause). 
119. Apostolic Pentecostal Church v. Colbert, 169 F.3d 409, 414-15 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(explaining that procedural rules are not statutes because they are promulgated through 
delegated authority and not usually affirmatively adopted by the legislature). 
120. See, e.g., Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., 313 F.3d 
385, 392 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have the force of 
statutes); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 146 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th 
Cir. 1998) (stating that procedural rules are as binding as any federal statute); United States 
ex rei. Tanos v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 361 F.2d 838, 839 (5th Cir. 1966) (explaining that 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have the same force and effect as statutes); Am. Fed'n 
of Musicians v. Stein, 213 F.2d 679,686 (6th Cir. 1954) (stating that federal procedural rules 
have the force and effect of statutes); Wilkes v. United States, 192 F.2d 128, 129 (5th Cir. 
1951) (explaining that legislative authorization and approval give procedural rules the force 
and effect of statutes). 
121. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 15 (1940); 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., 
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 'Il1.04[l][c] (3d ed. 2003). 
122.28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000). 
123. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 306 F.3d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 2002) (resolving 
conflict between FED. R. APP. P. 4 and an earlier federal statute by applying traditional 
principles of statutory interpretation because the court viewed the rule to be the same as a 
federal statute); United States v. Kim, 298 F.3d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 2002) (analyzing the same 
conflict and giving effect to the later-enacted rule because "[t]he rule trumps the statute"), 
modified in other respects by 317 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2003). 
124. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 9-10 (explaining, in the context of upholding FED. R. CIV. P. 
35 and 37, that "Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of 
federal courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to this or other federal courts 
authority to make rules not inconsistent with the statutes or Constitution of the United 
States") (citation omitted); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965) (acknowledging that 
the Rules Enabling Act delegated congressional rulemaking authority to the courts); see also 
Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Pa., 975 F.2d 102, 107 n.1 (3d Cir. 
1992) (construing a local district court rule as beyond the court's rulemaking power and 
noting that "the federal courts have recognized that ru1emaking authority is ultimately a 
legislative power residing in Congress, although delegated in large measure to the courts") 
(internal citation omitted). Although Sibbach and Hanna concerned the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are also promulgated pursuant to 
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One question the statuto~ mechanism raises is the degree to which courts 
retain independent, inherentl2 authority to regulate procedure. As the Supreme 
Court has recognized, the federal courts have the authority to regulate procedure in 
the absence of congressional action. 126 Thus, for example, federal courts have 
inherent authority to dismiss a complaint sua sponte for lack of prosecution, 127 
regulate admission to the bar,128 and punish contemf.t even in the absence of 
national rules or legislation authorizing those actions. 12 This inherent authority has 
been described as "self-executing" judicial power that courts, acting as courts, must 
have to resolve cases before them. 130 It is distinguishable from non-self-executing 
delegated legislative authority under the Rules Enabling Act. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. 
Woods, 480 U.S. 1,5 n.3 (1987). 
125. The courts' ability, as courts, to take the steps necessary to resolve cases before 
them has been described as "inherent," "incidental," and "implied" authority. See, e.g., 
Chambers v. NASCa, Inc., 501 u.s. 32, 35 (1991) (resolving a case that involved the scope 
of a federal court's "inherent" power to sanction); United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 
Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (referring to "implied powers" that courts possess "because they are 
necessary to the exercise of all others"); fIT Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 
1360 n.20 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting that inherent powers are sometimes called "incidental" 
powers). These terms all refer to the same type of power and are used interchangeably. 
Sometimes courts also use the term "supervisory" to describe courts' powers to take the 
steps necessary to resolve cases before them. See, e.g., Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 145 
(1985) (referring to the Sixth Circuit's use of "supervisory powers" to adopt a procedural 
rule); United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 759 (1st Cir. 1994) ("Supervisory power [is] 
sometimes known as inherent power .... "). Although the terms "supervisory power" and 
"inherent power" are sometimes used interchangeably, the two types of power are somewhat 
different. Inherent power refers to a court's ability to take action for itself that it deems 
necessary to process litigation to a conclusion. Supervisory power refers to the power of an 
appellate court to make and review procedures used by a subordinate court. Frazier v. 
Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 645 (1987) (referring to the Supreme Court's "inherent supervisory 
power" to review local rules to ensure that they are "consistent with the principles of right 
and justice") (internal citation omitted); Burbank, supra note 109, at 1040 n.102 
("'Supervisory rulemaking' refers to the promulgation of court rules for the conduct of 
proceedings in inferior courts and should be distinguished from local rulemaking, the 
promUlgation of court rules for the conduct of proceedings in the promulgating court."). 
126. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962) (noting that inherent 
authority is "governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to 
manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases"); 
see also Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43-44; Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 
(1980); Hudson, 11 U.S. at 34. 
127. Link, 370 U.S. at 630-31. 
128. Frazier, 482 U.S. at 645. Although the regulation of bar admission in that case was 
invalidated, the Supreme Court stated that the district court's inherent authority included the 
authority to regulate admission to its bar. [d. 
129. Hudson, 11 U.S. at 34. 
130. Holding hearings, compelling witnesses, and adjudicating claims are examples of 
actions within the courts' self-executing judicial power. Engdahl, supra note 107, at 84. 
Self-executing aspects of judicial power have been described as relating to "judicial 
potency." Judicial potency refers to power that must necessarily inhere in the courts for them 
to operate as courts and fulfill their function of deciding cases. [d. at 81-82. If a tribunal 
lacked the attributes of judicial potency, it would not be a ')udicial" body, at least in the way 
judicial bodies have been understood in Anglo-American legal traditions. [d. 
738 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vo1.79:711 
aspects of judicial power, such as conferring jurisdiction or appointing judges, 
which require action by another branch of government to be effectuated. 131 
Because the courts and Congress share authority for procedural rulemaking in 
the federal courts, the boundary between legislative and judicial power in this 
context can be difficult to delineate. Although the federal courts have inherent, or 
self-executing, judicial power to regulate ~rocedure, control over court procedures 
is ultimately a legislative prerogative. 13 Thus, on one end of the spectrum, 
Congress's legislative authority, whether exercised directly or delegated to the 
courts, can displace or limit the courts' inherent authority. 133 This is a function both 
of the Supremacy Clause, under which legislative enactments supersede judicially 
made rules,134 and the Rules Enabling Act, which authorizes federal courts to adopt 
local procedural rules so long as those rules do not conflict with national rules or 
federal statutes. 135 
131. For example, Congress had the choice between vesting the judicial power in one 
Supreme Court or in inferior tribunals as well; even the Supreme Court could not come into 
existence without a determination regarding the number of justices it would have, the 
nomination of justices by the President, and the confirmation of those justices by the Senate. 
[d. Because the judicial branch was dependent on the other two branches to come into being, 
its power cannot be considered completely self-executing, as the Supreme Court recognized 
in 1799 when it stated that "Article ill is non-self-executing with regard to subject matter 
jurisdiction." [d. at 83 (citing Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 n.1 (1799) 
(Chase, J.» (emphasis omitted). 
132. See, e.g., Ex parte Foshee, 21 So. 2d 827, 829 (Ala. 1945) (explaining that the 
legislature has the power to prescribe procedural rules for the courts and that legislative 
actions to regulate procedure supersede rules created by the courts); A. Leo Levin & 
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in 
Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 3 (1958) (noting that, although courts and 
legislatures have "[flor decades, if not for centuries" shared control over judicial rulemaking, 
legislatures have been "conceded ultimate authority over virtually the entire procedural 
area"); Weinstein, supra note 104, at 906 ("The taproot of rulemaking power in this country 
is legislative delegation, though there is also nourishment from the inherent role of a 
constitutionally independent judiciary."). 
133. The lower federal courts' exercise of inherent power can be limited by statute or 
rule. Chambers v. NASCa, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,47 (1991); see also Palermo v. United States, 
360 U.S. 343, 353 n.ll (1959) (noting that the Supreme Court's power to make procedural 
rules exists only the absence of legislation); United States v. Hom, 29 F.3d 754, 759-60 (1st 
Cir. 1994) (noting that the Supreme Court has made clear the general proposition that 
Congress may limit the inherent power of lower federal courts to regulate procedure by rule 
or statute). 
134. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; see also Katsh & Chachkes, supra note 60, at 316-19 
(explaining that "rules promulgated under a court's inherent power are subservient to the 
supremacy of statutory or constitutional dictates" and differentiating courts' "inherent" 
Article ill power to regulate procedure from rules generated though the statutorily created 
rulemaking process). For example, the Conformity Act of 1872 directed courts to use state 
law procedures regarding "the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding" in 
civil actions, "any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding," thereby displacing court 
rules adopted pursuant to inherent authority. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5-6, 17 Stat. 
196, 197; see also Chisolm v. Gilmer, 299 U.S. 99, 102-03 (1936) (holding that the 
Conformity Act of 1872, which directed federal courts to use state procedures, superseded a 
federal district court's local rule establishing a procedure for the same action that differed 
from the state procedure). 
135.28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2000). 
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On the other end of the spectrum are aspects of procedure that the courts can 
regulate, but that are beyond Congress's power. Both state and federal courts have 
invalidated legislative attempts to regulate procedure in ways that intrude on the 
courts' inherent judicial power, on the ground that the legislation violates principles 
of separation of powers. 136 Thus, for example, state courts have struck down 
statutes requiring written opinions in every case,137 delaying the issuance of a 
mandate for thirty days,138 attempting to control the management of the court's 
docket,139 and relieving parties of the judicially created obligation that they identify 
appealable errors and issues in their briefs. 140 Many of these decisions are relatively 
old state court decisions, but federal decisions of more recent vintage have cited 
136. See e.g., cases cited infra notes 137-40, 151; see generally Linda S. Mullenix, 
Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and Separation of Powers, 77 
MINN. L. REV. 1283 (1993) (arguing that, although Congress has some authority to make 
procedural rules for the federal courts, the courts also possess exclusive, inherent rulemaking 
power over some matters). 
137. Compare Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24, 25-26 (1859) (invalidating a state 
statute requiring the appellate courts to issue written opinions in all cases because courts 
retain the discretion to determine whether and how to deliver their opinions) and Vaughan v. 
Harp, 4 S.W. 751, 752 (Ark. 1887) (quoting Houston in invalidating a state statute requiring 
the court to "deliver written opinions in all cases involving a principle of law not previously 
settled by the court and reported") with State v. Gary, 247 S.E.2d 420 (W. Va. 1978) 
(adopting a rule through adjudication and pursuant to the court's inherent authority requiring 
decisions to deny bail when it is requested and opposed to be in writing). 
Imposing requirements regarding the manner in which courts deliver their opinions is a 
common example used to illustrate impermissible legislative control over court procedures. 
See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 3, at 8 (statement of Judge Kozinski) (suggesting that 
legislatures cannot require courts to issue written opinions); Paulsen, supra note 84, at 1590, 
1591 n.154 (questioning whether Congress could forbid federal judges from writing 
concurring or dissenting opinions and concluding that the power to speak the law includes 
the power to decide the content and manner of delivering opinions); Levin & Amsterdam, 
supra note 132, at 30 (using the requirement that courts issue written opinions in every case 
as an example of legislation that interferes with the exclusive domain of the judiciary). Thus, 
the fact that the West Virginia court used its inherent authority to impose such a requirement 
seems to be especially persuasive for showing that courts have inherent authority to regulate 
aspects of procedure that are beyond legislative control. 
138. Burton v. Mayer, 118 S.W.2d 547 (Ky. 1938) (relying on a state constitutional 
provision vesting legislative power in the legislature and judicial power in the courts). 
139. State ex rei. Kostas v. Johnson, 69 N.E.2d 592 (Ind. 1946) (relying on the state 
constitution's vesting clauses to invalidate a statute that permitted transfer of a matter held 
under advisement for longer than ninety days to another judge); State ex reI. Watson v. 
Merialdo, 268 P.2d 922 (Nev. 1954) (invalidating a statute that conditioned judges' pay on 
an affirmation that no matter on the docket had been pending for longer than ninety days; the 
court based the decision on the state constitution's vesting clauses, as well as a provision 
prohibiting reduction of judges' salaries during their terms of office); Riglander v. Star 
Constr. Co., 90 N.Y.S. 772 (App. Div. 1904) (striking down a statute giving scheduling 
preference to certain types of cases), affd, 73 N.E. 1131 (N.Y. 1905); Atchison, Topeka & 
Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. Long, 251 P. 486 (Okla. 1926) (invalidating a statute that required courts 
to try certain tax cases within ten days after the defendant answered). 
140. Solirnito v. State, 122 N.E. 578 (Ind. 1919) (invalidating a statute removing the 
requirement that the appellant present in the brief every error and exception upon which the 
appeal is based). The following year, the court reaffirmed its ruling and refused to overrule 
Solimito. Epstein v. State, 128 N.E. 353 (Ind. 1920). 
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them for the proposition that courts retain inherent authority beyond legislative 
reach. 141 
Although the federal courts claim this power, the outer limit of Congress's 
power to regulate procedure has been characterized as uncharted territory. 142 
Legislative attempts to control or limit the courts' exercise of their inherent 
authority have been rare,143 and the federal courts have been reluctant to invalidate 
legislative regulations of procedure on the ground that they intrude on the courts' 
exclusive authority. Thus, although the federal courts assert that they have inherent 
authority beyond Congress's reach,l44 they consistently interpret procedural 
legislation in ways that avoid direct conflict between legislative and judicial 
power. 145 For example, the Supreme Court interpreted a statute requiring jury trials 
in contempt matters to apply only to criminal contempt to avoid ruling that the 
statute im~ermissibly encroached on the courts' inherent authority to punish 
contempt. 1 Time limits for judicial action, which state courts have invalidated, 
have also been permitted by federal courts. In upholding the time limits, the federal 
courts have ruled that they retain equitable power to adjust the timetable as 
141. See, e.g., Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 562 n.7 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(collecting sources for the proposition that courts retain inherent autonomy in some matters); 
United States v. Brainer, 691 F.2d 691, 695-99 (4th Cir. 1982) (citing State ex rei. Kostas v. 
Johnson, 69 N.E.2d 592 (Ind. 1946); Riglander v. Star Constr. Co., 90 N.Y.S. 772 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1905); Atcheston, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Long, 251 P. 486 (Okla. 1926); 
and other cases and assuming "without deciding that federal courts possess some measure of 
administrative independence such that congressional intervention would, at some extreme 
point," encroach on the courts' exclusive inherent authority). 
142. E.g., United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 760 n.5 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that the 
question of whether the courts retain "some residuum of supervisory power" that Congress 
may not regulate, "or may only be regulated up to a certain point," has not been resolved); In 
re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 901 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that prior cases have not identified the 
precise inherent powers that courts possess that are beyond congressional reach). This is a 
question the federal courts have avoided for many years. See, e.g., Michaelson v. United 
States, 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924) (acknowledging that Congress can regulate the federal courts' 
inherent authority "within limits not precisely defined"); Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426, 442 
(1875) (declining to reach the issue of how far Congress can impair the courts' inherent 
powers or dictate the manner in which the courts exercise those powers). 
143. United States v. Rojas, 53 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting that 
congressional attempts to control the judiciary's inherent authority are rare); Stone, 986 F.2d 
at 901 (noting that the judiciary has core inherent powers that cannot be regulated by 
Congress, but that Congress has rarely attempted to interfere with those powers). 
144. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 146-47; Rojas, 53 F.3d at 1214-15 (noting that 
federal courts have inherent authority beyond Congress's reach, but its exact scope is 
uncertain; holding that a statute under which foreign nations certify their willingness to be 
subject to U.S. drug laws did not violate those inherent powers); Eash, 757 F.2d at 562 
(identifying three types of inherent judicial authority, including authority derived from 
Article III that is so essential to judicial functioning that it is beyond legislative control). 
Eash's description of the categories of inherent authority has been cited by other courts, but 
the Supreme Court has not found it necessary to adopt Eash's approach. Chambers v. 
NASCa, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,47 n.12 (1991). 
145. Linda S. Mullenix, Judicial Power and the Rules Enabling Act, 46 MERCER L. 
REv. 733, 738 (1995) (characterizing the federal courts as having "largely capitulated, with 
only muted objection, to Congress's conclusory fiats on rulemaking power"). 
146. Michaelson, 266 U.S. at 66-67. 
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necessary, even when the statutory lanrage has not so provided;147 that the time 
limit is merely advisory or hortatory; 14 and that the time limit does not require a 
decision by a particular time, but rather, temporarily adjusts the obligations of the 
parties until the court rules. 149 
Although the federal courts are reluctant to invalidate procedural statutes on 
the ground that they interfere with the courts' exclusive, inherent authority, the 
Supreme Court has done so on rare occasions. The Court has made it clear that it 
can, through adjudication, adopt procedural rules required by the Constitution, and 
that Congress has no authority to amend or abrogate those rules through 
legislation. ISO Further, although Congress can change substantive rules of decision 
in ways that are outcome determinative, it cannot use procedure to dictate the result 
in an individual case without changing the underlying substantive rule. 151 Thus, 
although the federal courts have acceded almost completely to congressional 
control over court procedures, some areas still remain exclusively within the 
courts'control. 
In the middle are procedural matters that Congress could, but has not, 
regulated. The Supreme Court has stated that federal courts "may, within limits, 
formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the Constitution or the 
147. Radix v. Johnson, 144 F.3d 925, 937 (6th Cir. 1998) (upholding the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act's provisions automatically staying prospective relief if the district 
court does not rule within the statutory time limit by reading in equitable power to stay the 
stay); United States v. Brainer, 691 F.2d 691, 695-99 (4th Cir. 1982) (accepting that the 
courts possess some inherent authority beyond Congress's reach, but upholding the Speedy 
Trial Act's time limits because the Act contains a number of exceptions permitting the court 
to extend the time, including a general authorization to extend the time for "good cause"); cf. 
Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000) (rejecting the reasoning of Hadix but upholding the 
statute on other grounds). 
148. In re Siggers, 132 F.3d 333, 336 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that courts have inherent 
authority to control the docket, but ruling that the time limit in the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act for courts of appeals to decide on successive habeas corpus 
petitions does not impermissibly infringe on that authority because the time limit is 
"hortatory or advisory rather than mandatory"). 
149. Miller, 530 U.S. 327 (upholding the Prison Litigation Reform Act's provisions 
automatically staying prospective relief if the district court does not rule within the statutory 
time limit on the ground that the statute imposes temporary consequences for failure to rule 
within the time limit, but does not actually require a ruling within the time limit). 
150. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). In that case, the Supreme Court 
determined that the judicially created procedural rule to safeguard against coerced criminal 
confessions adopted in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), could not be superseded 
by a federal statute enacted after Miranda providing a different rule. The Court explained 
that, although Congress retains the ultimate authority over non-constitutional procedural 
rules adopted by the judiciary, it does not have the power to modify or abrogate judicially 
created procedural rules that are required by the Constitution. Id. at 437. 
151. See, e.g., United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147-48 (1871) 
(determining that a statute, which provided that presidential pardons of individuals who 
supported the confederacy during the Civil War could not be used to show entitlement to 
return of property seized during the war, exceeded Congress's power). 
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Congress.,,152 This power flows both from delegated legislative authority and 
inherent authority. 
The delegated legislative authority comes from the provision of the Rules 
Enabling Act that empowers federal courts to promulgate local rules. 153 These rules 
may be promulgated pursuant to the statutory mechanism or adopted through 
adjudication. 154 It also comes from the national rules, which authorize lower federal 
courts to promulgate local rules and regulate procedure in individual cases in any 
manner consistent with federal statutes and national and local rules. ISS 
This authority is also inherent in the COurtS. 156 For example, federal district 
courts have used their inherent authority to promulgate local rules requiring 
prosecutors to obtain approval from the court before servinf a subpoena on an 
attorney,157 prohibiting television cameras in the courtroom, IS and sanctioning an 
attorney. 159 
In the context of regulating procedure in individual cases, the Supreme Court 
upheld a district court's imposition of sanctions that would not have been 
authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 or a federal statute permitting 
awards of attorneys' fees. 160 The Supreme Court determined that the rule and 
statute added to, but did not displace, the district court's inherent authority to 
impose sanctions in an individual case. The district court's action did not 
contravene the rule or statute, and Congress did not displace the district court's 
inherent authority to act in the case, because the sanctions were imposed for 
conduct not addressed by the rule or statute. 161 By contrast, a federal district court 
lacked inherent authority to grant an untimely motion for judgment of acquittal 
because doing so was directly contradictory to a national rule. 162 Congress's 
152. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996) (quoting United States v. 
Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983» (ruling that the district court lacked inherent authority 
to grant an untimely motion for judgment of acquittal). 
153.28 U.S.c. § 2071 (2000). 
154. Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 253 (1993) (explaining that FED. 
R. APP. P. 47 authorizes the federal circuit courts to make procedural rules "through 
rulemaking or adjudication") (Rehnquist, C.l., dissenting); Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 
145-46 (1985) (characterizing a rule adopted in a Sixth Circuit opinion, under which failure 
to object to a magistrate's recommendation at the district court level results in waiver of the 
right to appeal to the circuit court, as a rule of procedure adopted pursuant to the Sixth 
Circuit's inherent authority). 
155. FED. R. CIv. P. 83 (authorizing district courts to adopt local rules for civil 
matters); FED. R. CRIM. P. 57 (authorizing district courts to adopt local rules for criminal 
matters); FED. R. APP. P. 47 (authorizing the circuit courts to adopt local rules for appeals). 
156. See Katsh & Chachkes, supra note 60, at 319 n.118 (collecting cases in which 
local procedural rules were upheld based on the courts' inherent authority to promulgate 
them). 
157. Whitehouse v. United States District Court, 53 F.3d 1349 (1st Cir. 1995). The 
Third Circuit ruled the opposite way on this issue, but only because it thought the local rule 
was in conflict with a national rule, not because district courts lack inherent authority to 
regulate procedure. Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Pa., 975 F.2d 102, 
108 (3d Cir. 1992). 
158. Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16,20 n.6 (2d Cir. 1984). 
159. In re Sutter, 543 F.2d 1030, 1037-38 (2d Cir. 1976). 
160. Chambers v. NASCa, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991). 
161. Id. at 46-52. 
162. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996). 
2004] A GOVERNMENT OF LAWS AND NOT MEN 743 
delegated legislative authority displaced the court's inherent authority in that 
instance. 
The national procedural rules, including the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, fall on the legislative side of the spectrum because they are promulgated 
pursuant to delegated legislative authority and are ultimately within Congress's 
control. Congress has direct review over them. 163 It can add, modify, or reject rules 
when the courts submit them for review,l64 or in any piece of legislation. 165 Thus, 
the matters subject to regulation through the national rules are limited to those 
Congress could also validly regulate by statute. This limitation is not generally an 
issue because most procedural matters could validly be regulated either by 
Congress or the courts. It is, nevertheless, a limitation on the permissible scope of 
the national rules. To permit regulation of matters exclusively within the federal 
courts' inherent authority through the national rules would be tantamount to 
permitting Congress to legislate matters beyond its authority. As a consequence, for 
national rules adopted pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, the federal courts' 
inherent authority has been displaced by Congress's legislative authority. 166 
163. Local rules, by contrast, are not subject to congressional review. The Rules 
Enabling Act and the national rules provide that local rules cannot contravene federal 
statutes or national rules, thereby limiting the permissible scope of local rules. 28 U.S.C. § 
2071(a) (2000); FED. R. CIv. P. 83; FED. R. CRIM. P. 57; FED. R. APP. P. 47. Local rules 
promulgated pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act and national rules are not, however, 
submitted to Congress for review. Local circuit rules are subject to review only by the 
Judicial Conference, and local district rules are subject to review by the judicial conference 
of the circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (c). All local rules, whether promUlgated pursuant to the 
Rules Enabling Act or adopted through adjudication, are subject to review by the courts if 
they are challenged through litigation. See, e.g., Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987) 
(using supervisory authority to invalidate a local procedural rule promUlgated pursuant to the 
Rules Enabling Act and FED. R. CIv. P. 83); Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States,_ 507 U.S. 
234 (1993) (invalidating the Eleventh Circuit's local rule, adopted through adjudication and 
challenged on direct appeal, which provided that fugitives returned to justice after 
conviction, but before sentencing and notice of appeal, waive their right to appeal); 
Whitehouse v. United States District Court, 53 F.3d 1349 (1st Cir. 1995) (invalidating in a 
declaratory judgment action a local district rule requiring court approval prior to service of 
subpoenas on attorneys, which was promulgated pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act and 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 57). 
164.28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2000). 
165. For example, in the USA Patriot Act, Congress amended the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 203(a)(1), 219, 115 Stat. 272, 278-80, 291 
(2001) (amending FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 & 41). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act included amendments to FED. R. APP. P. 22(a) concerning writs of habeas corpus. Pub. 
L. No. 104-132, § 103, 110 Stat. 114, 118 (1996). See also United States v. Dickerson, 530 
U.S. 428, 437 (2000) ("Congress retains the ultimate authority to modify or set aside any 
judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the 
Constitution."). 
166. See supra notes 133-34 (explaining that Congress's delegated legislative authority 
can displace the courts' authority to adopt procedural rules). The dissenting justices in a 
1995 Supreme Court decision implicitly accepted this limitation on the permissible scope of 
national procedural rules in arguing that a statute that reopened final judgments in securities 
cases was constitutional. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (Stevens and 
Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). The dissent referred to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), 
which permits courts to reopen final judgments, as a "statute." Id. at 256. Justices Stevens 
and Ginsburg then argued that, if Rule 60(b) is constitutional, Congress must also have the 
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The requirement that national procedural rules be limited to matters within 
Congress's legislative power exists notwithstanding the fact that some national 
rules govern matters that in the past have been considered beyond legislative 
control, such as the content of afpellate briefs 167 or the requirement that some 
dispositions be issued in writing. 16 The courts' lack of objection to some aspects of 
the national rules stems from the fact that the federal courts themselves submitted 
those rules to Congress. If Congress attempted to change those requirements in 
favor of requirements that impeded the federal courts' ability to function, such as a 
requirement that all dispositions be in writing, the courts might well find that the 
rules intrude on matters beyond legislative control. 169 What these examples 
illustrate is that at least some aspects of "[r]ulemaking of necessity fallD into a 
blurred area where precise separation of the powers of the independent branches is 
inappropriate." 170 
The fact that some of the national rules fall into a gray area of shared 
legislative and judicial power "does not, however, require total abandonment of the 
concept [of separation of powers] in the context of rulemaking." 171 It is true that the 
federal courts have the inherent authority to regulate most aspects of procedure in 
the absence of congressional action, and it is also true that the inclusion of rules 
relating to matters traditionally outside of legislative control have made their way 
unchallenged into national rules promulgated pursuant to delegated legislative 
authority. This does not mean, however, that the federal courts are free to call upon 
their inherent authority to justify national procedural rules on matters that Congress 
could not legislate. Fundamentally, the national rules, like the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, must be limited to matters Congress could legislate because 
they flow from delegated legislative power, not from judicial power. It may be 
difficult in some instances to delineate precise boundaries between legislative and 
judicial power and, for technical matters, it may not be worth the effort. Where the 
boundaries can be drawn, however, they must be observed, especially in matters of 
authority to reopen final judgments through the statute at issue in the case. [d. at 256-57. 
This argument assumes that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are statutory enactments 
and that they cannot authorize actions beyond Congress's legislative power. Congress seems 
to concur that rulemaking is a legislative act. Edwin J. Wesley, The Civil Justice Reform Act; 
The Rules Enabling Act; The Amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; CJRA Plans; Rule 
B3-What Trumps What?, 154 F.R.D. 563, 570 (1994) (identifying references in the Civil 
Justice Reform Act's legislative history referring to limitations on rulemaking power 
delegated to the Supreme Court and to Congress's exclusive power to enact procedural 
rules). But see Mullenix, supra note 136, at 1287 ("Congress is wrong in declaring-as it 
does in the legislative history to the [Civil Justice Reform] Act-that it has exclusive federal 
rulemaking power."). 
167. FED. R. APP. P. 28 (establishing the required contents of appellate briefs). 
168. FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(2) ("If the district court denies the motion [for a party to 
proceed in forma pauperis], it must state its reasons in writing."). 
169. See infra Part rn.A (setting out the analysis for determining whether a statute 
impermissibly interferes with the federal courts' judicial power); Hearings, supra note 3, at 
16 (statement of Judge Kozinski) (suggesting that a statute requiring written opinions in 
every case, struck down in Houston v. Williams, might still be unconstitutional today). 
170. Weinstein, supra note 104, at 928. 
171. [d. 
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policy.172 Because the national rules are statutory in character, they can validly 
regulate only matters within Congress's legislative authority. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON PROHIBITING NON-PRECEDENTIAL OPINIONS By 
STATUTE OR NATIONAL RULE 
Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 is the first effort on the 
national level to regulate the federal appellate courts' use of non-precedential 
opinions. Although the proposed rule affects only citation practices, some judges 
believe it is the first step toward prohibiting non-precedential opinions through the 
national rules. 173 Because the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are 
fundamentally statutory in character, their permissible scope is co-extensive with 
Congress's legislative authority to regulate court procedures. Even if Congress 
were not motivated to act on its own on this issue, attempts to regulate the process 
through the national rules could spur Congress to exercise its legislative power in 
ways that would effectively prohibit non-precedential opinions. 
For example, if a national rule prohibiting prospective designation of opinions 
as non-precedential were submitted for congressional review, it could go into effect 
without congressional action. The rule would only be valid, however, if Congress 
could directly legislate its content. 174 Alternatively, if a national rule authorizing 
the present practice were proposed, along the lines of the language to that effect in 
an early version of proposed Rule 32.1,175 Congress could act legislatively to 
change that rule. If Congress simply abrogated the rule in its entirety, the federal 
appellate courts would revert to their present local rules governing non-precedential 
opinions. Congress has been known, however, to rewrite rules submitted for 
review. 176 The submission of a rule authorizing prospective designation of opinions 
as non-precedential could prompt Congress to legislate a contrary rule. Moreover, 
if Rule 32.1 is adopted in its present form, its implied acceptance of non-
precedential opinions could cause Congress to act affirmatively to prohibit the 
practice of issuing them. 177 
172. Id. at 929-30 (suggesting that Congress refrain from adjusting technical details of 
national rules submitted for its review and limit its review to basic policy issues). 
173. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text. 
174. See supra Part II. 
175. Alternative A for proposed Rule 32.1 provided that "[a] court of appeals may 
designate an opinion as non-precedential." NOVEMBER MEETING, supra note 35, at 23. See 
supra note 69 and accompanying text for discussion of this proposal. Although the Advisory 
Committee has indicated that it is not inclined to propose a rule to that effect at this time, it 
is possible that one could be proposed in the future. 
176. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACfICE & 
PROCEDURE § 1001 (3d ed. 2002) (noting a new trend since the early 1980s in which 
Congress increasingly involves itself in rulemaking and listing examples in which Congress 
amended rules submitted for review and enacted procedural legislation outside of the 
rulemaking review process); Mullenix, supra note 145, at 735-36 (noting that "[j]udicial 
rulemaking was a truly sopoforic issue until the early 1980s, when Congress unexpectedly 
began to flex its legislative muscle in the procedural rulemaking arena," resulting in "what 
can only be charitably characterized as Congress's arrogant, heavy-handed usurpation of 
procedural rulemaking authority in the last decade"); see also supra note 165. 
177. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text (explaining how proposed Rule 32.1 
implicitly accepts the use of non-precedential opinions). 
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Such a rule or statute raises constitutional concerns about whether it intrudes 
on an aspect of procedure committed to the exclusive, inherent authority of the 
courts. A rule or statute that required the federal appellate courts to give binding 
weight to all of their opinions all of the time would not be constitutional because it 
would interfere with their ability to interpret the law in the context of adjudicating 
individual cases free from legislative control. I78 It would not be necessary, 
however, for Congress to go that far. 
Instead, Congress could simply remove the federal appellate courts' discretion 
to opt out of their own rules of precedent. Congress could do this by prohibiting the 
panels deciding cases (or individual judges or internal committees of any type) 
from prospectively designating some of their own opinions as non-precedential. 
This would make all opinions subject to the generally applicable rules of precedent 
in force within the circuit. A statute of this type would not intrude on the federal 
appellate courts' Article III powers because it would not define the weight, if any, 
that they must accord to their own prior opinions, nor would it dictate a rule of 
precedent for the courts. The federal appellate court would remain free to create or 
change the generally applicable rules defining the weight of prior opinions, as they 
are now. All the statute would do is prevent the federal appellate courts from opting 
out of whatever rules of precedent they adopt by prospectively cate~orizing 
selected opinions in a way that takes them outside the system of precedent. I 9 
Proposed Rule 32.1, if adopted, would also invoke Congress's legislative 
power because it is a national rule. Rule 32.1 does not present precisely the same 
constitutional issues that a statute or rule prohibiting prospective designation of 
selected opinions as non-precedential does because it addresses only citation 
practices. It, too, is constitutional because it leaves control over the rules of 
precedent with the courts. 
Part III.A first explains the standards for evaluating the constitutionality of a 
rule or statute prohibiting selective prospective designation of opinions as non-
precedential. Part III.B analyzes the constitutionality of such a rule or statute. Part 
III.C then proceeds to analyze the constitutionality of proposed Rule 32.1. Because 
the national procedural rules flow from delegated legislative authority, the use of 
the term "statute" below includes both legislation and national rules. 
A. The Constitutional Framework/or Analyzing Statutes and Procedural Rules 
The federal courts acknowledge that regulation of court procedure is a 
legislative prerogative, but Congress cannot legislate in ways that intrude on the 
courts' judicial power without running afoul of separation of powers principles. 180 
178. Paulsen, supra note 84, at 1596; see also infra Part m.B. 
179. See infra Part m.B. 
180. Although Congress can validly regulate court procedures in general, it would be 
possible for a procedural rule to interfere with the federal courts' ability to perform their 
functions to such an extent that it would violate separation of powers principles. Martin H. 
Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political Perspectives, 46 
MERCER L. REv. 697, 725 (1995); see generally Mullenix, supra note 136 (arguing that 
separation of powers limitations prevent Congress from regulating procedure in ways that 
encroach on judicial power); Dean Alfange, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Separation of 
Powers: A Welcome Return to Normalcy?, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 668, 672 (1990) 
(discussing how the Supreme Court has resolved separation of powers questions). 
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The Constitution vests each "department" of government with its own duties and 
powers.181 Each branch is limited to the performance of functions committed to it 
by the Constitution, and the other branches are not permitted to intrude on those 
functions. This concept of separation of powers is an accepted limitation on the 
actions of all three branches of govemment. 182 
For federal legislation to be valid, therefore, it cannot exceed the legislative 
authority granted to Congress by the Constitution,183 nor can it intrude on another 
branch's power. The Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to enact 
legislation that is necessary and proper for executing the judicial power. l84 The 
Supreme Court has also said that the power to establish lower federal courts carries 
with it the power to regulate their procedures, but this power must be "supported by 
a grant of federal authority contained in Article I or some other section of the 
Constitution.,,185 Thus, although these two clauses appear to be separate sources of 
legislative authority, the Supreme Court treats them as co-extensive. 186 Even 
though the Constitution grants Congress affIrmative authority to legislate court 
procedures, that legislation cannot intrude on the federal courts' Article III judicial 
power. The analysis of these two factors-whether the legislation is supported by 
an affIrmative grant of power and whether it intrudes on the federal courts' judicial 
power---collapses into one in the context of procedural legislation. A procedural 
statute that intrudes on the courts' Article III power would not be a "proper" 
executory statute, and therefore, would exceed Congress's legislative authority.187 
181. U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, & ill (referring to governmental branches as "departments" 
and defining the respective duties and powers of each department). 
182. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 342 (2000) (noting that the Constitution requires 
the separation of judicial and legislative power); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) 
(explaining that the Constitution divides the government into three branches "to assure, as 
nearly as possible, that each Branch of government would confine itself to its assigned 
responsibility"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120-22 (1976) (explaining that, although the 
Constitution does not require "hennetic sealing off of the three branches of government from 
one another," it nonetheless established a system of separation of powers). 
183. Authority for legislation must come from an enumerated power. City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507,516 (1997); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 
405 (1819) (noting that the federal government is one of enumerated powers); Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (noting that the powers of the legislature are 
defined and limited). 
184. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 18. 
185. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). 
186. See supra note 107. 
187. To be valid under the Necessary and Proper Clause, a statute must be both 
necessary and proper. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. A statute is "necessary" if its means are 
suitably related to its ends. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 413-14. The "necessary" requirement, 
therefore, has not proven to be a significant restraint on Congress. Lawson, supra note 107, 
at 199. 
To be "proper," legislation cannot encroach on the judiciary's Article ill powers. See 
generally Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A 
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993) (analyzing 
the meaning of the tenn "proper" in the Sweeping Clause (otherwise known as the 
Necessary and Proper Clause) and concluding that the clause constrains Congress's choice 
of means to execute federal powers in a variety of ways, including limiting congressional 
actions to those that do not usurp the constitutional powers of another branch of the federal 
government); see also Paulsen, supra note 84, at 1568 (arguing that Congress could 
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Accordingly, the pivotal question is whether a statute prohibiting federal appellate 
courts from prospectively designating selected opinions as non-precedential 
intrudes on the courts' judicial power. 
In determining whether the actions of one branch intrude on powers vested in 
another branch, the Supreme Court has taken two alternative approaches, the 
formalist approach and the functionalist approach. 188 The formalist approach is 
rule-bound and almost syllogistic. 189 It evaluates whether the action of one branch 
usurps a function that the Constitution vests in another branch. Once a function is 
categorized as "legislative," "executive," or "judicial," then performance of that 
function by another branch violates separation of powers, except in those instances 
in which the Constitution grants authority for shared power. Under this approach, 
Congress cannot legislatively usurp for itself or delegate to another branch 
functions committed to the federal courts as part of their Article III judicial 
power. 190 
The functionalist approach evaluates whether the action of one branch impedes 
another branch in the performance of its constitutional duties. This approach 
accepts that complete separation of government powers is impossible. It balances 
the risk that one department will become too powerful relative to the other 
branches against the social goals sought to be accomplished. Under this approach, 
legislation through which Congress exercises "some" judicial power is valid so 
long as it does not give Congress "too much" power or unduly undermine the 
courts' ability to perform their "essential" or "core" functions. 191 The functionalist 
approach finds support in the Madisonian view of separation of powers. According 
to Madison, the Constitution permits the three branches of government to have 
"partial agency in" or "control over the acts of each other.,,192 The principle of 
separation of powers is subverted only "where the whole power of one department 
is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another 
department.,,193 Something less than one branch's whole power, however, can be 
shared by another branch. 194 The functionalist approach, therefore, balances the 
allocation of power between branches. 
statutorily eliminate stare decisis for the Supreme Court in abortion cases, but 
acknowledging that such a statute would have to be "proper" to be valid). 
188. These two approaches are described in a multitude of sources. See, e.g., Mullenix, 
supra note 136, at 1290-92; Redish, supra note 180, at 709-12; Adrian Vermeule, The 
Judicial Power in the State (and Federal) Courts, 2000 SUP. CT. REv. 357,362-63. 
189. Redish, supra note 180, at 709-10; Vermeule, supra note 188, at 363. 
190. "The Constitution prohibits one branch from encroaching on the central 
prerogatives of another." Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000); see also Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121-22 (1976) (explaining that Congress cannot transfer its legislative 
power to the President or the judicial branch, nor can it take on executive or judicial power 
for itself) (citing Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,406 (1928». 
191. See supra note 188. Deciding what is "too much" power and whether an action 
"unduly" undermines another branch's authority can be difficult. Redish, supra note 180, at 
711-12 (describing functionalist models as indeterminate); Mullenix, supra note 136, at 
1293-94 (explaining that a functionalist approach requires balancing interests involved in 
questions of allocation of power). 
192. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 309 (James Madison) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000) 
(emphasis in original). 
193.ld. at 309 (emphasis in original). 
194. Vermeule, supra note 188, at 363. 
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The Supreme Court's opinion in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. 195 illustrates 
the analysis of separation of powers conflicts between Congress and the judiciary 
under both approaches. In that case, Congress passed a statute retroactively 
extending the statute of limitations for certain claims under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934. The effect of the statute was to reopen final judgments for some 
claims that had been dismissed as untimely before Congress extended the statute of 
limitations. 196 The Supreme Court invalidated the statute on separation of powers 
grounds. 
The majority opinion used a formalistic approach. 197 It defined the judicial 
power to include the power to render dispositive judgments. 198 Because the statute 
usurped the judicial function of finally resolving individual cases on the merits, it 
violated separation of powers principles. 199 The majority rejected any sort of 
functionalist balancing. According to the majority, "the doctrine of separation of 
powers is a structural safeguard rather than a remedy to be applied only when 
specific harm, or risk of specific harm, can be identified.,,2oo It is, therefore, a 
"prophylactic device" establishing clear distinctions between legislative and 
judicial power.201 
Justice Breyer's concurrence, by contrast, illustrates the functionalist approach. 
According to Justice Breyer, if a statute risks giving too much power to Congress, 
it is invalid.202 He concluded that a statute that reopens final judgments sometimes 
presents this risk, but not always. The statute at issue in Plaut presented that risk 
because it applied only retroactively and only to a small, identifiable group of 
people. It therefore risked singling out particular individuals for oppressive 
treatment by the government203 and constituted a legislative attempt "to apply, as 
well as make, the law.,,204 Thus, Justice Breyer concurred with the majority in 
declaring the statute unconstitutional. 
The dissenters also employed functionalist analysis, but reached the opposite 
conclusion. According to the dissent, statutes that involve some commingling of 
the functions of the legislative and judicial branches are permissible so long as they 
pose no danger of aggrandizement of Congress's power or undue encroachment on 
the judiciary's power.205 The retroactive reopening of the judgments affected by the 
longer statute of limitations did not direct the outcome in the reopened cases. It 
"merely remove[d] an impediment to judicial decision on the merits," and 
therefore, did not violate separation of powers principles. 206 
195.514 U.S. 211 (1995). 
196. [d. at 212-17. 
197. The Plaut majority's strongly formalist approach has been characterized as "alarm 
clock formalism." This is the jurisprudential equivalent of setting an alarm clock one hour 
early so that one wakes on time even if one sleeps after the alarm clock goes off. In the 
separation of powers context, it refers to using overprotective rules to guard against attempts 
to encroach on judicial power. Vermeule, supra note 188, at 365-66. 
198. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 219. 
199. [d. 
200. [d. at 239 (emphasis in original). 
201. [d. 
202. [d. at 241-42 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
203. [d. at 242-44. 
204. [d. at 241 (emphasis in original). 
205. [d. at 260 (Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
206. [d. 
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As Plaut demonstrates, both the formalist and functionalist approaches hold 
sway with various members of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has not 
been consistent in its choice of approaches for resolving separation of powers 
questions.207 For this reason, its contemporary separation of powers jurisprudence 
has been criticized as "unpredictable, ad hoc justice.,,208 Moreover, although the 
formalist and functionalist labels provide some assistance in understanding 
contemporary separation of powers cases, older cases are harder to categorize and 
could reasonably be justified using either approach.209 Analyses of decisions in 
which the Supreme Court has considered statutes affecting the judiciary illustrate 
the variable approaches the Court has taken. 
The Supreme Court has invalidated statutes affecting the judiciary on 
separation of powers grounds in three circumstances: when the statute vests review 
of judicial decisions outside of Article III Courts,2lO attempts to direct the outcome 
of an individual case on the merits,2I1 or, as in Plaut, reopens final judgments.212 
As discussed above, the Plaut majority used a formalist approach, but the decision 
could have been justified on functionalist grounds as well, as Justice Breyer's 
concurrence shows. The same is true of the other decisions invalidating legislative 
encroachments on judicial Fower. 
In Haybum's Case,21 a statute granted to an executive officer the review of 
courts' Article III decisions regarding entitlement to pensions. The Supreme Court 
invalidated the statute on the ground that Congress could not delegate Article III 
powers to another branch of government. Doing so usurped the courts' judicial 
power. Similarly, in United States v. Klein,214 the Supreme Court refused to give 
effect to a statute directing it to treat a presidential pardon as evidence of disloyalty 
barring compensation for goods confiscated during the Civil War. According to the 
Court, the statute was an attempt by Congress to dictate the result in an individual 
case pending before the Court, in effect directing judgment in favor of the 
207. Compare, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (using fonnalist analysis to 
strike down the legislative veto) with Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 
U.S. 833 (1986) (rejecting formalism expressly and using a functionalist balancing test in 
upholding the Commission's power to hear state law counterclaims). 
208. Mullenix, supra note 136, at 1295. 
209. The formalist approach is also evident in some of the state court decisions 
invalidating procedural statutes. These decisions defined judicial power broadly, to include 
matters related to the internal functioning of the courts, such as control over the docket or 
over the content of briefs. They then concluded that legislative control of these matters 
usurped the judicial function. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text. The federal 
courts generally have not defined the judicial power as broadly as some state courts have. 
See generally Vermeule, supra note 188 (detailing the analytical approaches in state cases 
addressing separation of powers questions and contrasting them with the approaches used by 
the federal courts). 
210. Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408,409 (1792); see also Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218 
(explaining that Hayburn' s Case "stands for the principle that Congress cannot vest review 
of the decisions of Article III courts in officials of the Executive Branch"); Miller v. French, 
530 U.S. 327, 342-43 (2000) (quoting Plaut on the meaning of Hayburn's Case). 
211. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). 
212. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218-19. 
213.2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 409. 
214. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 128. 
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government, and thereby usurping the judicial function of deciding cases.215 The 
language in both cases sounds formalistic, referring to usurpation of functions 
committed to the judiciary. It would be easy to reach the same results, however, 
using functionalist analysis. Vesting review of judicial decisions in executive 
officers and directing the outcome in individual cases could easily be seen as 
vesting "the whole judicial power" in another branch and unduly impeding the 
courts in the performance of their judicial function of resolving cases on the merits. 
The Supreme Court has also upheld legislation that potentially diminished the 
judicial power against se~aration of powers challenges. Two examples are 
Mistretta v. United States 16 and Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. 
Schor,217 both of which showcase functionalist reasoning. In Mistretta, the 
Supreme Court upheld the Sentencing Reform Act, which established the United 
States Sentencing Commission ("USSC"). The USSC is charged with creating 
sentencing guidelines for federal crimes. The guidelines shift most of the discretion 
in determining appropriate sentences from individual district court judges to the 
USSC.218 The Court reasoned that this shift was constitutional because sentencing 
has never been the exclusive province of the courts, but rather, has historically 
resided in a "'twilight area' in which the activities of the separate Branches 
merge.,,219 Prior to the creation of the USSC, Congress had established by statute 
the ranges of punishments for federal crimes; judges had exercised virtually 
unlimited discretion in determining punishments for individual defendants within 
the statutory ranges; and executive officers, through the parole process, had 
determined how much of their sentences defendants actually served.22o 
The Court determined that the statutory scheme did not alter the balance of 
power between the legislative and judicial branches to such a degree as to violate 
the Constitution.221 The USSC, although it is an independent body, is located 
within the judicial branch. Because significant control over sentencing remains 
with the judiciary, the USSC's activities did not diminish the courts' judicial 
power.222 The creation of the USSC also did not aggrandize the judicial branch by 
giving the judiciary legislative power more properly belonging to Congress, nor did 
it undermine the integrity of the judicial branch by involving it in policy matters 
better resolved by the political branches of government.223 
The Court also balanced the policy justifications for the creation of the USSC 
against the potential effect on judicial power. One reason for the creation of the 
USSC was dissatisfaction over disparities in sentences imposed on similarly 
situated defendants. Earlier attempts to address this problem had not been 
215. [d. The exact scope of Klein has been a subject of ongoing debate. The modern 
gloss on the opinion, however, is that it stands for the proposition that Congress cannot 
direct the outcome of an individual case without changing the underlying substantive law. 
See, e.g., Miller, 530 U.S. at 348-49 (explaining Klein); Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218 (explaining 
Klein). 
216.488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
217.478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
218. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363-67. 
219. [d. at 386. 
220. [d. at 364-65. 
221. [d. at 395. 
222. [d. 
223. [d. at 393. 
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successful. 224 Indeed, the Court characterized the problem of sentencing disparities 
as a "seemingly intractable dilemma.,,225 Accordingly, any reallocation of powers 
occasioned by the creation of the USSC was justified by the need to create an 
expert bod~ to undertake "the intricate task of formulating sentencing 
guidelines." 26 
In Schor, the Supreme Court determined that the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission ("CFTC"), an entity empowered to resolve claims of violations of the 
Commodity Exchange Act, could hear state law counterclaims arising out of the 
disputes the CFTC was empowered to hear.227 In considering the separation of 
powers challenge to having state law claims adjudicated by a non-Article III 
tribunal, the Court engaged in functionalist balancing. It "declined to adopt 
formalistic and unbending rules," choosing instead to "weigh[] a number of factors, 
. . . with an eye to the practical effect that the congressional action will have on the 
constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary.'ms 
The Court determined that the statutory scheme, although a departure from 
Article Ill's requirements, did not aggrandize Congress's power or impermissibly 
diminish the judiciary's power for several reasons: the CFTC is limited to hearing 
state law counterclaims; it resolves cases only in a narrow substantive area of law; 
its decisions are reviewable by Article III courts; and litigants retain the option of 
pursuing their claims in court instead of before the CFTC.229 In reaching its 
conclusion, the Supreme Court considered Congress's purpose in creatin~ an expert 
body capable of resolving specific types of claims inexpensively. 30 It also 
explained that Congress could not displace the federal courts by creating a system 
of non-Article III tribunals empowered to resolve all cases that Article III courts 
ordinarily would resolve, but determined that the de minimis intrusion on the 
judicial power occasioned by the statutory scheme in this case was justified.231 
Although the use of the functionalist approach generally signals that legislative 
action will be upheld against a separation of powers challenge,232 the Supreme 
Court recently upheld provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act using an 
essentially formalist approach in Miller v. French.233 The Court considered a 
224. [d. at 365-66. 
225. [d. at 384. 
226. [d. at 412. 
227. Schor, 478 U.S. at 841. 
228. [d. at 851. 
229. [d. at 852-56. 
230. [d. at 856. 
231. [d. at 855-56. 
232. Some have observed that use of the formalist approach generally results in 
invalidation of the challenged action, while use of the functionalist approach generally 
results in upholding the challenged action. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 136, at 1292 n.31. 
Interestingly, in the context of challenges to legislation involving conflicts between the 
federal judiciary and Congress, the Supreme Court has recently applied formalist analysis. 
See, e.g., Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 
211 (1995). In the context of legislation involving cooperation (or at least not involving 
conflict) between the federal judiciary and Congress, by contrast, the Supreme Court has 
used functionalist analysis. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); Schor, 
478 U.S. at 847-48 (1986). 
233.530 U.S. 327. 
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provision of the Act that automatically stays injunctions in prison litigation if a 
district court does not make specific findings within the statutory time limit. 
In upholding the automatic stay provision. the majority defined the judicial 
power narrowly. as the power to decide individual cases finally on the merits. It 
then concluded that. because the automatic stay provision is temporary. suspending 
a judicial order only until the district court makes the requisite findings. it does not 
usurp the judicial function of finally deciding cases on the merits?34 The automatic 
stay provision "does not by itself 'tell judges when. how. or what to do ... •235 
The majority then turned to the issue of the time limit triggering the automatic 
stay. The prisoners argued that placing a deadline on judicial decisionmaking 
interferes with core judicial functions. a functionalist argument that the majority 
rejected. The majority stated that time limits in general do not implicate the 
structural concerns of separation of powers because they do not "deprive courts of 
their adjudicatory role." but rather. merely "encourage[] courts to apply [new 
substantive standards] promptly.,,236 The majority declined to say whether a time 
limit could. in theory. be so short that it would effectively usurp the courts' 
adjudicatory function. 237 
As these cases demonstrate. the Supreme Court has used both formalist and 
functionalist approaches in resolving cases involving separation of powers conflicts 
between the federal judiciary and Congress. The Court's recent use of formalism in 
Miller and Plaut suggests that it might be inclined toward a formalist approach in 
evaluating a statute prohibiting prospective designation of selected opinions as non-
precedential. This is especially so because the statute would directly affect judicial 
decisionrnaking. as did the statutes at issue in those cases. Nevertheless. some of 
the justices clearly adhere to functionalism; thus. the statute could be evaluated 
under that approach as well. Accordingly. the next Part analyzes such a statute 
using both formalist and functionalist approaches. showing that it is constitutional 
under either approach. 
234. [d. at 346. 
235. [d. (quoting the lower court's opinions in French v. Duckworth. 178 F.3d 437. 449 
(7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook. J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc». 
236. /d. at 349-50. The application of new substantive standards to a prior order did not 
present a constitutional problem because the orders at issue provided prospective relief. 
Congress does not violate separation of powers by changing the substantive standards 
justifying prospective relief. Because injunctions are subject to the continuing jurisdiction of 
the court. they are not the "final word" of the judicial department and are subject to revision 
based on changes to the underlying substantive law. [d. at 347. 
237. [d. at 350. The brevity of the time limit was an issue for the concurring justices. 
They were concerned that the time limit might be so short that the automatic stay would 
inevitably go into effect. [d. at 352 (Souter and Ginsburg. JJ .• concurring). If that were the 
case. Congress would. for all practical purposes. have ''usurp[ed] the judicial function of 
determining the applicability of a general rule in particular factual circumstances." [d. 
Without further fact finding on that issue. however. the concurring justices were unable to 
conclude that the statute was unconstitutional. [d. The dissenters would have interpreted the 
statute to avoid the constitutional question by reading in authority for courts to extend the 
time if necessary. [d. at 354 (Breyer and Stevens. JJ .• dissenting). 
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B. Could Non-Precedential Opinions Be Prohibited by Statute or National Rule? 
A statute ·prohibiting selective prospective designation of opinions as non-
precedential can be justified on formalist and functionalist grounds. The statute 
would not usurp a judicial function, nor would it unduly diminish judicial power or 
aggrandize legislative power at the expense of judicial power. Accordingly, no 
matter which analytical methodology is used, the statute would be constitutional. 
The analysis of the statute using either approach starts from the premise that 
the federal appellate courts' practice of designating opinions as non-precedential is 
constitutional. This premise is not without controversy. Adherence to precedent has 
been described as "of fundamental importance to the rule of law.',238 The Supreme 
Court, in its most detailed exposition of the role of stare decisis in constitutional 
adjudication, stated that "the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own 
Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by 
definition, indispensable.',239 Nevertheless, the Constitution clearly does not require 
absolute adherence to precedent.24o The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that 
stare decisis is judicial policy, not a constitutional requirement. As recently as 
2003, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that "[t]he doctrine of stare decisis is essential 
to the respect accorded to the judgments of the Court and to the stability of the law. 
It is not, however, an inexorable command." 241 
238. Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197,202 (1991); see also Patterson v. 
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989). 
239. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992); see 
Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172 ("The Court has said often and with great emphasis that 'the 
doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law.' Although we have 
cautioned that 'stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of 
adherence to the latest decision,' it is indisputable that stare decisis is a basic self-governing 
principle within the Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the sensitive and difficult task 
of fashioning and preserving a jurisprudential system that is not based upon 'an arbitrary 
discretion."') (citations omitted); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986) (explaining 
that stare decisis ensures against erratic changes in the law and protects society's expectation 
that fundamental legal principles are founded on law, rather than on individual judges' 
proclivities); see also Hearings, supra note 3, at 50 (statement of Professor Arthur D. 
Hellman) (stating that allowing courts to decide cases without regard for prior precedent 
"violates basic norms of equality and indeed the rule of law"). 
240. See cases cited infra note 241; see also Healy, supra note 3, at 54-91 (arguing that 
history supports the proposition that, even if courts generally were expected to follow 
precedent, they were not expected to give precedential effect to all of their decisions). 
241. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2483 (2003) (invalidating Texas sodomy law 
as violative of privacy rights under the Due Process Clause and overturning Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986». The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that stare decisis 
is not "an inexorable command." This precise phrase appears regularly in the Supreme 
Court's discussions of stare decisis. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235-36 
(1997); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-30 (1991). Even Casey, in wliich the Court 
used stare decisis to justify reaffIrmation of Roe v. Wade, recognized that horizontal stare 
decisis is not a constitutional mandate. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854. As the Court explained in 
Payne, courts cannot adhere to prior precedent in all circumstances: 
Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, 
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters 
reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived 
integrity of the judicial process. Adhering to precedent is usually the 
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Although strict adherence to prior precedent is not constitutionally compelled, 
the question of the constitutionality of prospectively designating opinions as non-
precedential has not been definitively resolved. In AnastasoJf v. United States, the 
Eighth Circuit concluded that issuing non-precedential opinions exceeded the 
courts' Article III judicial power?42 Some have argued that non-precedential 
opinions may violate due process.243 Others have argued that non-precedential 
opinions are permissible.244 The Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 
deliberately declined to address the question of the permissibility of issuing non-
precedential opinions, opting instead simply to address citation restrictions. The 
Advisory Committee did so in gart because it did not want to weigh in on the 
constitutionality of the practice.2 
Determining whether the practice of issuing non-precedential opinions is or is 
not constitutional is something only the federal courts can do. The power to say 
what the law is includes the power to interpret the Constitution; Congress cannot 
tell the courts what the Constitution means or requires.246 The federal courts have 
consistently upheld the practice of issuing non-precedential opinions. The lone 
exception, Anastasoff, was vacated by the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc, and the 
Supreme Court has declined (so far) to address the issue.247 Thus, although sound 
arguments support the conclusion that non-precedential OpInIOnS are 
unconstitutional, the federal courts do not seem likely to reach that conclusion 
anytime soon. 
If non-precedential opinions are unconstitutional, a statute prohibiting them 
would not present a constitutional problem. From a formalist perspective, the 
judicial power cannot include the power to do unconstitutional acts. Thus, 
Congress does not usurp the judicial power by prohibiting an unconstitutional 
method of decisionmaking. From a functionalist perspective, Congress cannot 
wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the 
applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right. Nevertheless, 
when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, this 
Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent. Stare decisis is not 
an inexorable command; rather, it is a principle of policy and not a 
mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision. 
Payne, 501 U.S. at 827-28 (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Stare decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 570, 581-82 (2001) (arguing that excessive focus on the Supreme Court's 
description of stare decisis as judicial policy is a mistake because the use of the term 
"policy" implies only that stare decisis is a principle that can be overridden in appropriate 
circumstances and because the fact that a principle is not absolute does not mean that it lacks 
constitutional stature). 
242.223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
243. See, e.g., Melissa H. Weresh, The Unpublished, Non-Precedential Decision: An 
Uncomfortable Legality?, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 175, 193-95 (2001). 
244. See, e.g., K.K. DuVivier, Are Some Words Better Left Unpublished?: Precedent 
and the Role of Unpublished Decisions, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 397 (2001); Healy, 
supra note 3. 
245. See supra note 69 (explaining why the Advisory Committee took no position on 
the permissibility of non-precedential opinions). 
246. See infra notes 252-53 and accompanying text (explaining that the task of 
constitutional interpretation belongs to the courts). 
247. See supra notes 14-18 (setting out the history of litigation on the issue of non-
precedential opinions). 
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aggrandize itself or take on too much power by prohibiting the courts from using 
unconstitutional means of reaching decisions.248 Moreover, it would not be possible 
for the federal courts legitimately to declare non-precedential opinions 
unconstitutional and simultaneously to strike down a statute prohibiting them. For 
the federal courts to conclude that the issuance of non-precedential opinions is 
unconstitutional, but that they retain power beyond Congress's reach to continue to 
use an unconstitutional method of decisionmaking, strains credulity. Accordingly, 
if a statute prohibiting the federal appellate courts from prospectively designating 
selected opinions as non-precedential presents a constitutional problem at all, it 
must be because the statute prohibits a practice that the federal courts may 
constitutionally employ. 
I. Formalist Analysis 
The formalist approach posits that Congress cannot perform a judicial function 
that the Constitution commits to the federal courts as part of their Article III 
judicial power. A formalist analysis of the statute, therefore, turns on whether 
Congress usurps a judicial function by eliminating the federal appellate courts' 
ability prospectively to designate selected opinions as non-precedential. Congress 
does not usurp a judicial function simply by eliminating the federal appellate 
courts' ability selectively to opt out of their own rules of precedent. Accordingly, 
the statute would survive constitutional scrutiny under the formalist approach. 
A statute that prohibits selective prospective designation of opinions as non-
precedential does not dictate the result in an individual case, and therefore, does not 
violate the principle of United States v. Klein. 249 Klein prohibits Congress from 
directing the result in an individual case without changing the underlying 
substantive rule.25o A statute prohibiting selective prospective designation of 
opinions as non-precedential does not direct the federal appellate courts to rule in 
favor of any party in any case.251 Thus, it does not contravene Klein. 
The statute also leaves the federal appellate courts free to interpret the law in 
any way they see fit. Interpreting the law is unquestionably a judicial function. As 
the Supreme Court said 200 years ago, "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty 
of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to 
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. ,,252 Alexander 
Hamilton's Federalist No. 78, one of the most commonly cited sources of 
understanding about the scope of the judicial power, also described judges' 
authority to interpret the law in the context of the need to give them lifetime tenure: 
248. Gary Lawson has argued that Congress has no power to control judicial 
decisionmaking, even when the courts use unconstitutional methods to decide cases. 
Lawson, supra note 107, at 194-95. This argument, however, reaches too far. Taken to its 
logical extreme, it would prevent Congress from prohibiting courts from deciding cases 
based on coin flips or skin color. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lawson's Awesome, 18 CaNST. 
COMMENT. 231, 232 (2001). 
249.80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). 
250.1d. 
251. See supra note 215 (explaining the modem gloss on Klein). 
252. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 177 (1803). 
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The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the 
courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as 
a fundamental law. It must therefore belong to them to ascertain its 
meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from 
the legislative body.253 
757 
The power to interpret the law includes the authority to choose methods of 
decisionrnaking.254 If Congress could tell the courts what process to use in 
interpreting the law, it could control outcome, in effect telling the courts what the 
law is.255 "[I]t is almost silly to say that the core of the judicial power is merely the 
power to reach a result, without reference to the process by which that result is 
reached. Accordingly, Congress can pass substantive laws, but it cannot tell the 
courts how to identify, construe, and apply them.,,256 
253. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 498 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed., 
2000). See also, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363-65 (2001) 
(explaining that defining constitutional guarantees is the responsibility of the Supreme 
Court, not Congress); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.s. 507, 519-24 (1997) (same). The 
ability to interpret and implement the Constitution has been described as one of the 
minimum requirements of judicial independence. Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of 
Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 315, 325-26 (1999); see also Redish, supra note 
180, at 712. 
254. Alexander Hamilton confinned that the Framers understood the power to interpret 
the law to include the power to choose methods of decisionmaking. He explained that 
federal courts would have the power to interpret conflicting statutes, and if the statutes could 
not be reconciled, to determine which statute was in force. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 498-
99 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000). The method for making that 
determination "is a rule not enjoined upon the courts by legislative provision but adopted by 
themselves, as consonant to truth and propriety, for the direction of their conduct as 
interpreters of the law." Id. at 436; see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 
225 (1995) ("If the legislature cannot ... indirectly control the action of the courts, by 
requiring of them a construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it 
cannot do so directly, by ... directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of 
ajudicial inquiry.") (quoting Thomas Cooley's 1868 treatise on constitutional law). 
255. Once Congress vests authority in the federal courts to adjudicate a case, it is 
prohibited by separation of powers principles from controlling the outcome of the case, 
either by directing a decision for one of the parties or by excluding from the court the power 
to resolve particular legal or factual questions that arise in the case. Redish, supra note 180, 
at 713; see also Burbank, supra note 253, at 335-36 (decisional independence is necessary 
for the resolution of ordinary cases according to the law). 
256. Lawson, supra note 107, at 211. The ability of the federal courts "to interpret and 
apply, rather than create, substantive legal principles in the specific context of an individual 
adjudication, free from control or interference by the purely political branches of the federal 
government" has been termed decisional independence. Redish, supra note 180, at 717; cf. 
Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218-19 ("The record of history shows that the Framers crafted this charter 
of the judicial department with an expressed understanding that it gives the Federal Judiciary 
the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them, subject to review only by superior 
courts in the Article ill hierarchy .... ") (emphasis in original). 
The power to choose decisionmaking methodologies is not absolute. Congress 
legislatively controls judicial decisionmaking in a variety of ways, including through the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and statutes requiring deferential standards of review for certain 
agency decisions, to name just two examples. Paulsen, supra note 84, at 1583-90. 
Nevertheless, Congress cannot control the way the federal courts interpret the law. 
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Thus, for example, Congress cannot tell the courts that Case A means X and is 
to be interpreted as such, even if Congress could enact X as the substantive rule of 
decision, and it certainly could not dictate the meaning of Case A if the case 
interpreted the Constitution. Congress could not control the decisionmaking 
process by saying that, in statutory interpretation, courts must flrst look at A, then 
B, and then C, which would effectively be a statute deflning the weight of 
authorities A, B, and C.257 To do so would be an attempt to control the courts' 
determination of cases involving statutory interpretation on the merits and would 
effectively make Congress the judge in its own case on questions of statutory 
interpretation. Similarly, if a statute prohibiting selective prospective designation of 
opinions as non-precedential is a backdoor method of controlling the federal 
courts' interpretation of the law, then it usurps a judicial function. 
As long as the statute did not specify the weight, if any, that federal appellate 
courts must accord to their own opinions, it would leave the courts in control of the 
rules of precedent. The principles of horizontal stare decisis that the federal 
appellate courts presently follow require them to treat all precedential opinions 
issued by panels within the circuit as binding precedent. 258 If, by statute, federal 
appellate courts were prohibited from prospectively designating selected opinions 
as non-precedential, all federal appellate decisions would then necessarily belong 
to the precedential category. That would have the effect of making all opinions 
binding authority on later applying courts within the circuit. 259 
Although this would be the effect of the statute under the presently existing 
principles of horizontal stare decisis, the statute would not require that result. It 
would leave the courts free to make any generally applicable rule of horizontal 
stare decisis they desired. Indeed, as long as the statute merely prohibited selective 
prospective designation of opinions as non-precedential, it would not require the 
federal appellate courts to follow horizontal stare decisis at all. If they wanted to 
adopt a rule prospectively declaring all of their opinions non-precedential, in effect 
abandoning the requirement of horizontal stare decisis, they would be free to do so 
under the statute as long as they determined that doing so comports with the 
Constitution.260 
257. Lawson, supra note 107, at 212-13, raises a version of this hypothetical. He rejects 
this type of statute, saying that the choice among decisionrnaking methods, including how 
much weight to give to various authorities, is inherent to the judicial power; thus, 
congressional regulation of this type would not be proper. [d. at 214; see also Fallon, Jr., 
supra note 241, at 576-77 (arguing that a statute that directs courts to give less weight to 
prior cases than they would under principles of stare decisis also irnpennissibly controls 
decisionmaking because it effectively directs the court to give greater significance to other 
methods of decisionmaking, such as original understanding). 
258. See AMy E. SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH: TOOLS & STRATEGIES 4-6 (2d ed. 
2003) (explaining differentiations among types of authority, including the difference 
between binding and nonbinding authority). 
259. See supra note 80. 
260. See, e.g., Katsh & Chachkes, supra note 60, at 288 n.5 (questioning whether 
horizontal stare decisis in the federal appellate courts is constitutionally required and 
suggesting that the rule may simply be one of convenience and prudence). Abandoning 
horizontal stare decisis would not eliminate the problem of arbitrary decisionmaking and 
could exacerbate it. Although the statute would leave this option open for the courts, it is 
unlikely that they would take it, even assuming that it would be constitutional for them to do 
so. Stare decisis prevents courts from having to revisit the same issues repeatedly. Thus, 
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Moreover, as long as the statute focused on prospective designation of the 
precedential status of opinions, it would not force an all-or-nothing choice between 
making all cases either fully binding precedent or not precedent at all. There are 
gradations of precedent, some of which are entitled to greater deference than are 
others.261 A statute that prohibited selective prospective designation of opinions as 
non-precedential would still permit the federal appellate courts to create different 
categories or tiers of precedent. For example, Stephen Barnett has advocated the 
creation of a new category of "overrulable" precedent. A panel decision designated 
as "overrulable" would be binding unless and until a later panel overruled it in a 
fully binding opinion. A fully binding opinion would be subject to the usual rule of 
horizontal stare decisis; later panels within the circuit would be required to follow 
it unless and until it was reversed or overruled by the court sitting en banc or the 
Supreme Court.262 Nothing in the statute would prevent courts from adopting a 
system like that. 
Finally, acting as applying COurts,263 the federal appellate courts could 
recognize exceptions to the rule of horizontal stare decisis as circumstances so 
require, including ad hoc exceptions, as they have done in the past. 264 The only 
thing they could not do is selectively "opt out" of their own system of precedent, 
whatever that system might be, by prospectively designating selected opinions as 
non-precedential and, therefore, outside of the system. 
Of course, the judicial power is more than the power to reach a result. It also 
includes the power to express the reasoning of a decision; the result and the 
reasoning often cannot be divorced from one another.26S Judges have argued that 
the ability to designate opinions prospectively as non-precedential, while not result 
despite claims that making all opinions precedential would create too much work for the 
courts, eliminating horizontal stare decisis could actUally create more work by requiring 
courts to revisit settled issues. 
261. Barnett, supra note 3, at 22-25 (identifying five categories of precedent and 
suggesting that relaxation of the law of the circuit rule might give federal appellate courts 
the flexibility to manage their dockets without prospectively declaring some opinions non-
precedential); see also Hearings, supra note 3, at 46-47 (statement of Professor Arthur D. 
Hellman) (criticizing polarized positions under which courts must either treat non-
precedential opinions as fully binding or be free to disregard them entirely and suggesting 
that more nuanced alternatives for defining precedent would be useful). 
262. Barnett, supra note 3, at 22-25. Barnett uses the term "published" opinion to 
describe the type of binding opinion subject to the usual rule of horizontal stare decisis. [d. 
Whether Congress could, by statute or rule, establish this type of precedential system for the 
federal appellate courts is questionable; so long as the rule or statute prohibiting designation 
of selected opinions as non-precedential left this and other options open for the courts, it 
would be constitutional. 
263. A "deciding court" is a court that issues a decision. An "applying court" is a court 
that has to decide whether to apply an earlier deciding court's decision. See supra text 
accompanying note 82 (defining the terms "deciding court" and "applying court" for 
purposes of horizontal stare decisis). 
264. See supra note 80 (noting exceptions to the generally applicable rule of horizontal 
stare decisis). 
265. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1994) (explaining 
that the judicial power is more than the power to reach a result); Union Pac. R.R. v. City of 
Atoka, 6 Fed. App. 725, 730 (10th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the scope of prior precedent 
for purposes of adhering to a prior panel decision includes not only the holding, but also the 
reasoning); Paulsen, supra note 84, at 1590 & n.154 (concluding that the power to say what 
the law is includes the power to choose the form of expression of an opinion). 
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altering, affects the reasoning in opinions and is intimately bound up with the 
development of the law.266 Even so, the statute would not affect the federal 
appellate courts' ability to craft opinions in the manner they see fit to communicate 
the results and reasoning in the cases they decide, because it would leave them in 
control of the form and content of their opinions. The statute would not require 
them to write opinions of a particular length, or even to write opinions at all. They 
would remain free to use summary dispositions, very short opinions, oral rulings, 
or any other method of communicating their opinions. Accordingly, the federal 
appellate courts would not lose their ability to fashion opinions as appropriate for 
the development of the law. Indeed, as a practical matter, they could issue opinions 
with so little information as to be of virtually no value to later applying courts, 
which would effectively render the opinions non-precedential. Although this might 
raise questions as to the wisdom of the statute, it does not affect the statute's 
constitutionality. 
Finally, the federal courts as an institution would remain in control of the 
development of the law because the statute would not affect their ability to change 
the law.267 Even if the federal appellate courts retained the traditional rule of 
horizontal stare decisis that they presently follow for precedential opinions, each 
circuit would still have the same ability that it presently enjoys, sitting en banc, to 
reverse or overrule its own precedents. Having to sit en banc to change panel 
decisions might be inconvenient for the courts, but that does not make the statute 
unconstitutional.268 The Supreme Court would also retain the ability to reverse or 
overrule circuit precedent, as it does now. Accordingly, the statute would not 
enshrine the present interpretations of federal law or the Constitution in a way that 
would prevent the federal courts from changing those interpretations if they wanted 
to do SO.269 
266. In fact, judges say they join non-precedential opinions even when they do not 
agree with the reasoning, such that the opinions may not actually reflect the court's 
reasoning. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 3, at 13 (statement of Judge Kozinski) (explaining 
that a non-precedential opinion does not always reflect the court's actual reasoning); see also 
infra notes 291-92 and accompanying text. 
267. Cf Miller v. French, 530 u.s. 327, 347 (2000) (explaining that Congress can 
change the substantive rules and apply them retroactively to pending cases because any 
interim resolution is not the final word of the judicial department; the power over final 
determinations applies to the judicial department as a whole, not to individual courts). 
268. Cf Radix v. Johnson, 144 F.3d 925, 951 (6th Cir. 1998) (Norris, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (explaining that the inconvenience of meeting the statutory time 
limits in the Prison Litigation Reform Act should not render the statute unconstitutional). 
The majority reasoning in Hadix was rejected in Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000), 
which upheld the statute on other grounds. 
269. A statute mandating that the Supreme Court follow its own prior opinions would 
be unconstitutional because it would effectively enshrine existing constitutional 
jurisprudence in perpetuity. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 84, at 1596. A statute prohibiting 
federal appellate courts from prospectively designating selected opinions as non-precedential 
is distinguishable from this type of statute. Because the statute would leave open the 
possibility for decisions to be overruled by the court sitting en banc or by the Supreme 
Court, it would not enshrine existing jurisprudence on the Constitution or any other area of 
law in perpetuity. Moreover, the statute would not require the federal appellate courts to give 
binding weight to their own opinions. 
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The statute would be analogous to the automatic stay provision of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act that the Supreme Court upheld in Miller v. French. 270 That 
Act, which imposes an automatic stay on court orders in prison litigation if district 
courts do not rule on pending matters within defined time limits, affects the timing 
of judicial decisionmaking, a discretionary matter that has historically been within 
the courts' control.271 Congress was concerned, however, that the federal courts 
would use this procedural power to avoid applying new substantive standards in 
prison litigation, using control over timing to affect the outcome in the case. The 
automatic stay provision was designed to circumvent the courts' use of procedure 
in this way, but the provision did so in a way that did not direct the outcome of the 
case.272 Under that Act, the courts can avoid the imposition of the automatic stay 
simply by ruling within the statutory time limit. Even if the automatic stay goes 
into effect, it is only temporary until the court rules on the merits of the case. The 
automatic stay has no effect on the ultimate resolution of the case.273 
A deciding court's designation of the status of its opinion is similar. The 
courts' traditional ability to use procedure (control over publication decisions) to 
effect at least some prospective control over the precedential value of their opinions 
is analogous to their traditional control over the timing of decisions.274 Eliminating 
the federal appellate courts' ability to designate selected opinions prospectively as 
non-precedential to avoid the effect of horizontal stare decisis is analogous to 
eliminating their ability to use timing delays to avoid applying new substantive 
standards. Both are separate from the resolution of the underlying case on the 
merits. Like the statute upheld in Miller, a statute prohibiting selective prospective 
designation of opinions as non-precedential would not tell the courts "when, how, 
or what to do.'.27S 
Because the statute would not dictate the results in individual cases, control the 
courts' interpretation of the law, or require them to issue opinions in any particular 
form or manner, it does not usurp the courts' adjudicatory function. Thus, under a 
formalist approach, the statute would not violate separation of powers principles 
and would be constitutional. 
270. 530 U.S. 327 (2000). 
271. [d. at 340-41. 
272. Judge Easterbrook, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en bane, noted 
Congress's concern that judges would not apply the Act's new criteria and cited an example 
of a judge who opined "that relief should continue for the judge's lifetime." French v. 
Duckworth, 178 F.3d 437,448 (7th Cir. 1999), rev'd sub nom. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 
327 (2000). 
273. Miller, 530 U.S. at 346. 
274. Courts during the founding era did not feel constrained by precedent the way 
courts do today. See, e.g., Healy, supra note 3, at 73-91. The exercise of the discretion to 
reject a prior opinion on the applying end, however, must be distinguished from the power to 
designate opinions as non-precedential on the deciding end-that is, prospectively. Without 
question, applying courts have historically had varying degrees of discretion in determining 
which authorities were binding on them. A statute prohibiting prospective designation of 
opinions as non-precedential would not affect the courts' ability on the applying end to 
decide what is or is not binding on them. See supra notes 258-63 and accompanying text 
(explaining that the statute would leave the federal appellate courts free to establish any 
constitutional rule of horizontal stare decisis on the applying end of the equation). 
275. Miller, 530 U.S. at 346 (quoting the Seventh Circuit's opinion below, Duckworth, 
178 F.3d at 449). 
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2. Functionalist Analysis 
Unlike the formalist approach, the functionalist avproach does not turn on 
whether Congress attempts to perform a judicial function, Rather, the functionalist 
approach evaluates the effect of the statute on the. relative balance of power 
between the judicial and legislative branches to determine whether it upsets the 
balance sufficiently to create a threat to liberty. It would assess whether the statute 
unduly interferes with the federal appellate courts' ability to perform their core 
function and whether it risks accumulating too much power in the legislative 
branch.276 An analysis of the scope of the statu~, the degree to which it leaves 
traditional judicial functions with the courts, and the concerns that would motivate 
Congress to act shows that the statute would not diminish the judicial power. 
Further, the statute would not aggrandize legislative power or create the risk that a 
small, identifiable group of individuals would. be singled out for oppressive 
treatment by the government. Accordingly, the statute would not upset the balance 
of power between Congress and the federal courts and would be constitutional 
under a functionalist analysis. 
One factor the Supreme Court has used in determining the effect of a statute on 
the judicial power is its scope.277 Concededly, the scope of the statute would be 
broad. It would affect the roughly 80% of cases that the federal appellate courts 
presently designate as non-precedential.278 Thus, as compared with the statute 
upheld in Schor, which affected only state law counterclaims arising out of claims 
under the Commodity Exchange Act,279 a statute prohibiting selective prospective 
designation of opinions as non-precedential would affect many more cases. Viewed 
differently, however, the statute would have less of an effect on judicial power than 
did the statute at issue in Schor because it would not remove any claim from 
consideration by Article III courts. Further, as Mistretta demonstrates, for a statute 
to affect a large percentage of cases is not fatal. The sentencing guidelines upheld 
in Mistretta affected all criminal cases ill the federal courts, which comprise a 
significant portion of the docket. 280 Thus, although the scope of the statute is one 
factor to consider in assessing whether the statute unduly diminishes judicial 
power, that factor is not dispositive. 
Another factor is the "extent to which the 'essential attributes of judicial 
power' are reserved to Article III COurts.,,281 As long·as the statute does not specify 
the weight, if any, that the federal appellate courts must accord to their own 
opinions, it would not interfere with the courts' core function of deciding cases, 
276. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text; see also Mistretta v. United 
States, 488 U.S. 361, 383 (1989); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 
833,851 (1986) (explaining that the Supreme Court evaluates statutes affecting the judiciary 
to determine whether they "impermissibly threaten[ ] the institutional integrity of the 
Judicial Branch"). 
277. See, e.g., Schor, 478 U.S. at 852 (explaining that one reason for upholding the 
statute was the limited subject matter over which the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission could exercise jurisdiction). 
278. See supra note 38. 
279. Schor, 478 U.S. at 835. 
280. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367-68. 
281. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line 
Co., 458 U.S. 50, 81 (1982». 
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thus leaving the essential attributes of judicial power with the federal courts. As 
discussed above, the statute would not dictate the results in individual cases or 
require the courts to interpret the law in a way that Congress prefers. It would leave 
the courts in complete control over the rule of horizontal stare decisis. Finally, the 
federal appellate courts sitting en banc and the Supreme Court would retain the 
power to reverse or overrule circuit precedent.282 
The effect of the statute in this respect echoes the effect of the sentencing 
guidelines upheld in Mistretta,283 which transferred substantial discretion to 
determine criminal sentences from individual judges to the USSC, an independent 
agency within the judicial branch. Similarly, a statute prohibiting prospective 
designation of selected opinions as non-precedential would transfer the discretion 
to determine the precedential status of an opinion from the panel deciding the case 
to a panel applying the case, the latter of which not only has the power to determine 
whether the prior case applies to the pending case, but also has the power to make 
generally applicable rules of precedent. Because the statute simply shifts discretion 
from one part of the judiciary to another; it does not diminish the judicial power. 
The statute also leaves the traditional attributes of judicial power with the 
courts by leaving the federal appellate courts in complete control of the form and 
content of their opinions.284 This fact defuses the argument that the statute would 
interfere with the courts' core function by interfering with docket management. 285 
Taking away the option of prospectively designating selected opinions as non-
precedential, the argument goes, would require judges to spend so much time 
writing opinions that they could not resolve the number of cases pending before 
them within a reasonable amount of time. 286 
It is true that an overburdened judiciary cannot be an effective protector of 
liberty.287 Nevertheless, it is not clear that eliminating prospective designation of 
selected opinions asnon-precedential would overburden the judiciary to such a 
degree that it could not function properly. This is an empirical question that is 
difficult to answer in the abstract. Even under the present system, some non-
precedential opinions are as comprehensive as their precedential counterparts. 288 
Moreover, the statute would not require the federal appellate courts to issue 
comprehensive or even written decisions in every case; control over the form and 
content of opinions would leave the courts a range of options for communicating 
282. See supra notes 257-69 and accompanying text. 
283. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 361. 
284. See supra notes 265-67 and accompanying text. 
285. Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 66-67 (1924). 
286. As Judge Alito has explained, one justification for non-precedential opinions is the 
judiciary's concern that making all opinions precedential would either reduce the quality of 
opinions or impose intolerable burdens on judges in researching and drafting opinions. 
Hearings, supra note 3, at 8. "It would be virtually impossible for the courts of appeals to 
keep current with their case loads if they attempted to produce such an opinion in every case. 
Responsible appellate judges must devote more time to an opinion that changes the law or 
clarifies it in an important way (and may thus affect many litigants in future cases) than to an 
opinion that simply applies well-established law to specific facts (and thus affects solely the 
litigants at hand)." [d. 
287. Alfange, Jr., supra note 180, at 693-94. 
288. Some non-precedential opinions are ''20-page, signed opinions contammg 
exhaustive legal analysis." NOVEMBER MEETING, supra note 35, at 36 (summarizing 
comments of an unnamed committee member). 
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their decisions if docket management concerns required them to reduce the time 
spent writing opinions. Federal rules do require written dispositions for some 
matters, but these requirements are rare and apply mostly to district COurtS.289 Thus, 
while the statute probably would create some additional work for the courts, it 
would not encroach on their core function of deciding cases. 
In addition, a third factor the Supreme Court considers in determining whether 
a statute impermissibly threatens the judiciary's institutional integrity is the 
concern motivating Congress's action.290 The concerns over arbitrary 
decisionmaking and judicial legitimacy that non-precedential opinions create are at 
least as weighty as the concerns that have justified other legislative initiatives 
affecting the judiciary. Although an increase in the number of summary 
dispositions would be a possible effect of the statute, Congress could reasonably 
determine that that risk is worth taking. As judges acknowledge, non-precedential 
opinions do not always reflect the actual reasoning of the COurtS.291 On one hand, 
some explanation of a result, even one that does not contain all of the judges' 
reasoning, may be preferable to a one-word disposition. On the other hand, the 
issuance of one-word dispositions may be preferable to issuing "non-precedential 
opinions that have been joined by judges who mayor may not agree with what the 
opinions say.,,292 A decision that does not reflect the court's actual reasoning could, 
in an extreme case, potentially be considered a fraud on the litigants and the pUblic. 
Accordingly, Congress's concern over this aspect of non-precedential opinions 
justifies the potential risk it creates of increased numbers of summary 
dispositions.293 
Looking at the other side of the equation, the statute would not increase 
Congress's power at the expense of the courts'. Congress would not gain any 
power through the statute. Although the statute would eliminate the federal 
appellate courts' ability prospectively to designate selected opinions as non-
precedential, it does not substitute a rule of precedent of Congress's choosing in its 
place. Like the statute at issue in Schor, a statute prohibiting prospective 
designation of selected opinions as non-precedential would not appreciably expand 
Congress's power.294 
Nor does the statute present the risk that concerned Justice Breyer in 
concurrence in Plaut: the risk that some small, identifiable roup of people will be 
singled out for oppressive treatment by the government. 29 Although some cases 
289. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(2) (requiring a district court's denial of motion to 
pursue an appeal in forma pauperis to be in writing). 
290. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 383-84 (1989); Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm'n v. Schorr, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986). 
291. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 3, at 13 (statement of Judge Kozinski) (explaining 
that a non-precedential opinion does not always reflect all of the three panel judges' actual 
reasoning); NOVEMBER MEETING, supra note 35, at 37 (noting that judges join 
non-precedential opinions as long as they agree with the result, even if they do not agree 
with the reasoning, when they know the opinions will not be precedential). 
292. NOVEMBER MEETING, supra note 35, at 37 (summarizing comments of unnamed 
committee member). 
293. Cf Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365-66 (explaining Congress's dissatisfaction with 
sentencing disparities as one reason for creating the USSC). 
294. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 856-57. 
295. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 242-43 (1995) (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
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might be resolved differently if judges cannot ignore earlier cases solely on the 
ground that those cases were designated as non-precedential, it is impossible to 
identify those cases, or the individuals affected by them, in advance. Thus, no 
identifiable group of persons would be targeted for oppressive treatment by the 
government under the statute. 
The statute would not diminish the power of the judicial branch or interfere 
with the federal appellate courts' ability to perform their adjudicatory function, nor 
would it risk aggrandizing legislative power at the expense of judicial power. Using 
a functionalist approach, therefore, the statute would be constitutional. 
C. Is the Proposed Rule Eliminating Citation Restrictions Constitutional? 
Proposed Rule 32.1, which would prohibit courts from restricting citations to 
non-precedential opinions, does not present the same constitutional concerns that a 
statute prohibiting non-precedential opinions would. Nevertheless, it merits 
analysis because it is the first national rule to attempt to regulate non-precedential 
opinions. This rule should pass constitutional muster under either formalist or 
functionalist reasoning. 
From a formalist perspective, the proposed rule does not usurp the judicial 
power. It does not dictate results in cases, nor does it control the courts' 
interpretation of the law or require the federal appellate courts to give any weight at 
all to non-precedential opinions.296 Federal appellate courts remain free to ignore 
non-precedential opinions solely on the ground that those opinions are not binding. 
All the rule does is prohibit courts from restricting citations to non-precedential 
opinions unless they impose the same restrictions on citations to precedential 
opinions. 
The proposed rule would also survive a challenge based on functionalist 
analysis, for many of the same reasons justifying a statute prohibiting prospective 
designation of selected opinions as non-precedential. The argument that the 
proposed rule would impede the courts' ability to perform their core function of 
deciding cases would have to be that it would interfere so substantially with the 
courts' ability to manage their dockets that it would unduly diminish the judicial 
power. Judges may say that the rule will make it harder for them to get through the 
docket because they will have to give more attention to their non-precedential 
opinions if they know those opinions can be cited later.297 As noted above, 
however, as long as judges retain control over the form and content of their 
opinions, the argument that writing citable opinions will be so burdensome for the 
courts as to constitute an unconstitutional intrusion on their essential functions is 
weak. 
296. But see Barnett, supra note 56, at 489-94 (arguing that proposed Rule 32.1 could 
be read to affect the weight that federal appellate courts accord to their non-precedential 
opinions). 
297. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 3, at 13 (statement of Judge Kozinski). 
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CONCLUSION 
Judges and lawmakers often assume that the federal courts use judicial power 
to promulgate procedural rules.298 But that is not the case, at least as far as the 
national rules are concerned. Because these rules flow from delegated legislative 
authority, they cannot be used to regulate matters beyond Congress's legislative 
power. In the case of prospective designation of selected opinions as non-
precedential, Congress could prohibit the practice by statute without running afoul 
of separation of powers principles as long as the statute did not specify the weight 
the federal appellate courts must give to their own opinions. Thus, it would also be 
possible to prohibit the practice through a national procedural rule or statute. 
Judges would undoubtedly prefer to retain the present system, which gives them 
discretion to apply flexible standards, over stricter rules.299 And they may chafe 
over legislative efforts to restrict their discretion.300 The risk of arbitrary 
decisionrnaking that the use of non-precedential opinions creates, however, makes 
the practice unwise. The courts' unwillingness to change the practice despite this 
risk makes a national rule or procedural statute an appropriate vehicle for 
addressing the issue. Whether this will happen remains to be seen. If it does, the 
Constitution will not stand in the way. 
298. See, e.g., id. at 3 (statement of Congressman Howard L. Berman) (noting that 
rulemaking is a judicial matter); id. at 15-16 (statement of Judge Kozinski) (stating that the 
issue of non-precedential opinions, while capable of resolution through new procedural 
rules, is a matter for the courts to resolve). 
299. Vermeule, supra note 188, at 390 (explaining that judges prefer standards that 
permit the exercise of case-specific judicial discretion over rules). 
300. [d. at 360 (characterizing some decisions on separation of powers issues as 
displaying "a prickly sensitivity to any slighting of judicial prerogatives"); id. at 391 (noting, 
in the context of separation of powers cases, that judges have a strong tendency to equate 
tasks that they customarily perform with fundamental judicial functions). 
